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THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNLAWFUL PREEMPTION AND THE LEGAL
DUTY TO PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS VICTIMS
Johannes van Aggelen *
This article starts from the premise that the international legal community
was exposed to a hegemonic interpretation of international law even before
9/11, and questions whether this exposure shook the foundations of interna-
tional law. The author concludes that this was not the case. However, the
U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11 has used this unilateral interpretation of inter-
national law to subject presumed Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners to treat-
ment in violation of U.S. obligations under human rights treaty law and
customary international law. This article considers preemption, preemptive
self-defense, the Bush doctrine, the war on terror, and its consequences for
human rights of its victims. It also analyzes relevant jurisprudence from
human rights bodies as well as from the U.S. Supreme Court and lower
courts and concludes that the Bush doctrine vitiated international law, de-
spite U.S. jurisprudential guidance. It exposes two interrogation techniques,
extra territorial rendition and waterboarding which amount to torture and
were frequently used by the Bush administration. Finally, the article shows
the way back to adherence to international law.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This article was originally presented to the seventy-third Interna-
tional Law Association (ILA) conference in August 2008 at a panel entitled
The (Mis)use of the Human Rights Argument and Preemptive Intervention
in the Contemporary International Arena. Due to important developments
directly bearing on the topic of this article, including hopeful signs by the
new U.S. administration, an update was considered necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before 9/11 and its aftermath, international law was exposed
to a hegemonic interpretation by the U.S. The question was raised whether
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such a position would shake the foundations of current international law.'
Although it was too early to conclude that the U.S.' attitude had indeed
changed the foundations of international law, it was observed that the U.S.
has moved away from traditional international law towards an increased use
of its own domestic legal system, making it a tool for foreign policy. The
adoption by Congress of the Patriot Act in October 2001 as well as the
American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA) in January 2002 are
clear examples in this regard. The various domestic legal proceedings re-
garding Guantdnamo detainees and the ensuing obstructions to it by the
Executive (e.g., the creation of Military Commissions in November 2001
and the Combat Status Review Tribunals in July 2004) confirm this trend.
Additionally, the U.S.' interpretation of preemptive or anticipatory
self-defense in the 2002 National Security Strategy, 2 its drafting of the ill-
famed torture memoranda where in the war on terror, law, and legal ethics
have been sacrificed to a misguided notion of political expediency,3 and
congressional attempts to circumvent the judgments handed down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld4 through the
enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) in December 2005,' fol-
lowed by the Military Commissions Act (MCA) signed into law in October
2006 in the wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 are all signs that, despite the
repudiation of almost the entire world legal community, this trend contin-
ued.7
See UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael
Byers & Georg Nolte eds. 2003). See also Johannes van Aggelen, 48 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L.
666 (2005) (book review) (reviewing id.).
2 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 6, 15 (2002), available at merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf.
3 See THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds. 2005). See also Scott Horton, Legal Ethics and the War on Terror: The Role of
the Government Lawyer: Ethics, Lawyers, and the Torture Memoranda, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 301 (2005).
4 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). See
also Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Unconstitutional Detention of Non-resident Aliens: Revisit-
ing the Supreme Court's Treatment of the Law of War in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 67 HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L. 843 (2007).
5 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 199 Stat. 2739 (2005).
6 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
7 See generally PHILLIPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL
OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008); PHILLIPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: DECEPTION, CRUELTY AND A
COMPROMISE OF LAW (2008); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE
WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). See also U.S. HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY MAJORITY, REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2009) (providing a
very detailed and critical assessment of the Bush presidency).
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The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medellin v. Texas held that
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decisions under the Vienna Consular
Convention are not binding federal law and rejected presidential enforce-
ment of ICJ judgments over state proceedings.8 In my opinion, the Medellin
opinion indicates that the U.S. was on the unilateral path in international
law during the Bush administration despite three earlier cases in which the
ICJ appealed to the U.S. government to adhere to international law. 9 It is
within this overarching framework of the current state of international law
in the international arena that this article deals with preemptive intervention
and the consequences for the human rights of its victims. 10
II. PREEMPTIVE INTERVENTION
In 1988, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) created a diction-
ary which clarified the difference between preemptive attack and preventive
war. 1' The DOD defines "preemptive attack" (preemption) as "[a]n attack
initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is
imminent."' 2 Preventive war is defined as "a war initiated in the belief that
military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would
involve greater risk."' 13 By analyzing these definitions, one could infer that
8 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
9 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 257
(Apr. 9) (Provisional Measures); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513-14
(June 27); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 33-35
(Mar. 31). On June 5, 2008, Mexico filed a request for interpretation of the Avena Judgment
and asked for the urgent indication of provisional measures. By order of July 16, 2008, the
court rejected the submission by the U.S. to dismiss the application and indicated provisional
measures. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J.
139 (July 16). On January 19, 2009, the court found that the matters claimed by Mexico to be
at issue between the parties, requiring an interpretation, were not matters which had been
decided by the court in its 2004 judgment and consequently could not give rise to the inter-
pretation requested by Mexico. See Request for Interpretation of 31 March 2004 in Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2009 I.C.J. 139, 61 (Jan. 19). It also found
that the U.S. had breached the obligation, incumbent upon it under the Order indicating pro-
visional measures, by executing Mr. Medellin. Id.
10 See Johannes van Aggelen, Withering International Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law: Principles at the Turn of the Millennium: Reflections on Guantanamo and Beyond, in 4
TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS: STUDIES IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR
ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE 67 (S. Fabris & Porto Alegre eds. 2005) (providing
a detailed appraisal).
11 U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS 428,
432 (2001) (as amended through Mar. 2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
jel/doddict/ (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 432. See also Steven J. Barela, Preemptive or Preventive War: A Discussion of
Legal and Moral Standards, 33 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 31, 32 (2004).
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there are in fact two different levels of anticipatory self-defense. Leaving no
doubt about the burden of proof for cases in which it is applied, the lan-
guage used to define preemption is particularly strong. On the other hand,
prevention implies a certain subjectivity that allows for interpretation in
each case in which it is applied.
The DOD defines the Law of War as "[t]hat part of international
law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the 'law
of armed conflict."'" 14 The 2006 Operational Law Handbook supports the
doctrinal concepts and principles of FM 3-0 and FM 27-100. The Handbook
states that "anticipatory self-defense serves as a foundational element" in
military operations, "as embodied in the concept of 'hostile intent' which
makes it clear [that commanders] ... should not have to absorb the first hit
before the right and obligation to exercise self-defense arises."'
15
A. Preemptive Self-Defense and the U.N. Charter
Article 21 of the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility
adopted by the International Law Commission, stipulates that, "[t]he wrong-
fulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful meas-
ure of self-defense taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Na-
tions." 16 The language of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter contemplates self-
defense only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations ....17 Consequently, the unsettled issue remains as to what consti-
tutes an armed attack.
The evolution of anticipatory self-defense in the pre-Charter era
into a working customary law doctrine prescribing use of force short of war
and proscribing certain conduct under its justification is accompanied by a
very well-articulated set of rules for usage. 18 The classic case in this respect
14 U.S. Dep't of Defense Directive 2311.01E, Dep't of Defense Law of War Program, 1
3.1, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d231101le.pdf.
15 U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 6
(John Raweliffe & Jeannine Smith eds., 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/
army/law0806.pdf.
16 Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, U.N. GAOR, Int'l L.
Comm'n, 53rd Sess., art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001). See also G.A.Res.
56/83, art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (from the eighty-fifth plenary meeting
on Dec. 12, 2001).
17 U.N. Charter art. 51.
18 See Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945: Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory
Self-Defense Doctrine in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2003) (provid-
ing a historic approach). See also HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. II, ch.
I, at 73-84 (A.C. Campell trans. 1993) (1901); EMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, bk. II, ch. IV, 154-60 (1852).
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is the 1837 Caroline case between the U.S. and the U.K. 19 In this case, the
court held that self-defense should be restricted to dangers which are "in-
stant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.,
20
Like reprisal, the U.N. Charter outlawed anticipatory self-defense in
1945.21 Traditional self-defense in response to an armed attack was the only
form of self-help that made it into the Charter.22 Although it was originally
intended to fit the regional arrangements, such as the inter-American sys-
tem, into the general organization that Article 51 was added to the Charter
in 1945, the law of self-defense has developed well beyond that purpose
over the last half a century.23 In the latter part of the twentieth century, re-
course to the right to self-defense became an important tool in the fight
against international terrorism.24 There is no indication that this develop-
ment was foreseen by the drafters of the Charter as there is no thorough
discussion of the term "armed attack" in the records of the San Francisco
Conference.25 On the contrary, the drafting history suggests that the framers
of the Charter left the concretisation of the concept of "armed attack" essen-
tially to the interpretation of its organs and member states. This aspect was
overlooked by Professor Myres McDougal who qualified Article 51 as "an
inept piece of draftmanship .... ,,26
B. Contemporary Views on Pre-emptive Self-Defense
Though Goodrich and Hambro's book on the U.N. Charter was the
leading reference during the mid-twentieth century, the book edited by
Judge Bruno Simma provides references to practices in the contemporary
arena. Simma concludes that an anticipatory right of self-defense would be
contrary to the wording of Article 51 (if an armed attack occurs) as well as
19 Werner Meng, The Caroline, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW 537 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 1992). See also R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82 (1938).
20 Meng, supra note 19, at 538.
21 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
22 Id.
23 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 165-66 (2001).
24 See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1996); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 115-19 (2004) (providing a survey).
25 See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25, 32-33 (1987); THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 788-806 (Bruno Simma et al. eds.
2002).
26 MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 234 (1961).
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to its object and purpose, which is to cut to a minimum unilateral use of
force in international relations.27 Since the alleged imminence of an attack
cannot usually be assessed by means of objective criteria, any decision on
this point would necessarily have to be left to the discretion of the state con-
cerned. 28 Indeed, as Anne Slaughter and William Burke-White observed,
Article 51 was designed in a world where the use of force primarily in-
volved attacks by one state against the territory of another state.29
However, on the bench Judge Simma appears to have changed his
mind. In a separate opinion in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo case, 30 he criticized the ICJ for avoiding its responsibility to clarify
the law as to whether an attack by a non-state actor could amount to an
armed attack. Simma maintained that:
Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the state,
or rather the prevailing interpretation, of the international law on self-
defense for a long time. However, in the light of more recent develop-
ments not only in State practice but also with regard to accompanying opi-
nio juris, it ought urgently to be reconsidered, also by the Court. As is well
known, these developments were triggered by the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, in the wake of which claims that Article 51 also covers defen-
sive measures against terrorist groups have been received far more favour-
ably by the international community than other extensive re-readings of
the relevant Charter provisions, particularly the "Bush doctrine" justifying
the preemptive use of force. Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and
1373 (2001) cannot but be read as affirmations of the view that large-scale
attacks by non-State actors can qualify as "armed attacks" within the
meaning of Article 51.31
Nevertheless, in my opinion, the manifest risk of an abuse of that discretion,
which thus emerges would defacto undermine the restriction to one particu-
lar case of the right to lawful self-defense. Consequently, Article 51 should
be interpreted narrowly as containing a prohibition of anticipatory self-
defense.
27 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 803-06.
28 Id. at 803.
29 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Consti-
tutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
30 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 45
I.L.M. 271, 369 (Dec. 19, 2005) (Simma, J., separate opinion).
31 Id at 370. See also Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations
in Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127 (2007).
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1. The Effective Control standard
Although the doctrine often refers to the Nicaragua judgment, the
ICJ did not pronounce itself on anticipatory self-defense in 1986.32 It re-
ferred to the effective control test. 33 Although the ICJ confirmed this effec-
tive control standard in the Congo (2005) and Genocide (2007) decisions,34
criticism has been mounting as to whether this threshold is still in confor-
mity with contemporary international law.
In 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) rejected the effective control test in
the Tadi6 case. 35 At issue was whether there existed an international armed
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In finding such a conflict, the Chamber
adopted a more relaxed standard than that articulated by the ICJ in 1986.
The key issue was "overall control," which went beyond mere financing and
equipping of armed forces and "also involved participation in the planning
and supervision of military operations., 36
Judge Peter Kooijmans in his separate opinion in the Congo case
also questioned the effective control standard maintained by the ICJ. He
argued that the ICJ had ignored the operational code evident in the interna-
tional community's reactions to the 2001 Coalition attacks against the Tali-
ban. 37 In Kooijmans' opinion, Taliban support for Al-Qaeda fell far below
the bar set in either the Nicaragua or Tadi6 judgments. Nevertheless, most
states approved Operation Enduring Freedom, with many offering material
38support. In particular Kooijmans stated:
If the activities of armed bands present on a State's territory cannot be at-
tributed to that State, the victim State is not the object of an armed attack
32 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 81 (June 27). See also id. at 347-48 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (clarifying that
Judge Schwebel did not agree with the construction of Article 51 to read "if, and only if, an
armed attack occurs," but finding that the terms of Article 51 do not eliminate the right of
self-defense under customary international law, thus leaving the door ajar).
33 See id. at 62-63. See also Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense
Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 791 (1948) (recognizing
over sixty years ago that support for non-state armed groups could amount to an armed
attack).
34 See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271, 310 (Dec. 19, 2005); Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M.
188, 391-92 (Feb. 26 2007).
35 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, IT-94- 1-A, Judgment, (July 15, 1999).
36 Id. 145.
37 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 45
I.L.M. 271, 357-58 (Dec. 19, 2005) (Kooijmans, J. concurring).
38 Id.
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by it. But if the attacks by the irregulars would, because of their scale and
effects, have had to be classified as an armed attack had they been carried
out by regular armed forces, there is nothing in the language of Article 51
of the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising its inherent
right of self-defense. 39
Similarly, Professor Oscar Schachter maintained almost twenty-five years
ago that one reading of Article 51 could limit self-defense to cases of armed
attack.4' However, since Article 51 is silent on the right to self-defense un-
der customary international law (which goes beyond cases of armed attack),
one could also deduct that such a right "leave[s] unimpaired the right to
self-defense as it existed prior to the Charter."' 1 The former president of the
ICJ already in the early 1960s maintained that the framers of the Charter
had drafted the wording in Article 51 broadly enough to allow for the use of
self-defense against acts emanating from non-state actors, as Article 51 re-
quired simply an "armed attack" and not an "armed attack by a state." This
choice would imply that the drafters of the Charter intended to cover all
modes of attack "as long as it was armed.,
42
2. Determining the lawfulness of preemptive force
The current position within the U.N. regarding anticipatory self-
defense is contained in the report of the Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, commissioned by the Secretary-General after
9/11.43 The panel questioned whether a state, without going to the Security
Council, could claim to act in anticipatory self-defense, not just preemp-
39 Id. at 358 (emphasis in original).
40 See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620
(1984).
41 Id. at 1634. See Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of
Military Force, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145 (2000) (maintaining that the presence of an armed
attack is one of the basis for the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense under Article
51, but not the exclusive basis). See also Edward McWhinney, International Law-Based
Responses to the September 11 International Terrorist Attacks, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 280,
280-86 (2002) (defending the legitimate defence based on customary international law
principles).
42 ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 200-04 (1963); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 242 (1994); J6rg Kammerhofer,
Uncertainties of the Law on Self-Defense in the United Nations Charter, 35 NETH. Y. B.
INT'L L. 143 (2004).
43 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/secureworld.
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tively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against a
non-imminent or non-proximate attack). 44 The panel concluded that the
short answer would be that if there are good reasons for preventive military
action, with good evidence to support them, recourse should be made to the
Security Council, which could authorize action.4 5 The panel also concluded
that:
For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a
world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and
the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply
too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action .... 46
The U.N. does not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article
51.47 For our analysis, reference should also be made to two Security Coun-
cil resolutions adopted in 2001 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. These
two resolutions are S.C. Res. 1368 and 1373.48 Although both resolutions
1368 and 1373 referred to the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense as recognized by the Charter, one should note that the reference is
made only in the preambular paragraphs. 49 It is of interest to note that the
ICJ rejected Israel's justification of building the wall separating Palestinians
and Israelis under Article 51 of the Charter. 50 The ICJ noted that Israel had
not claimed that the attacks against it were imputable to a foreign state; con-
sequently, the court concluded that Article 51 had no relevance in this
case.5 ' The court also rejected Israel's reliance on Security Council Resolu-
tions 1368 and 1373 since the situation was different from that contem-
plated by those resolutions.5 2 However, Judge Higgins, Judge Kooijmans,
and Judge Buergenthal vehemently opposed this position. 3 They pointed
out that the absence in Article 51 of any reference to a state as the originator
of an "armed attack," as well as the Security Council's self-evident charac-
terization of terrorist attacks as armed attacks in, inter alia, Resolutions
44 See id. at 63.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 id.
48 See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, Jan. 2001-July 2002, at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1368
(2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, Jan. 2001-July 2002, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (2001).
49 See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 48, at pmbl; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 48, at pmbl.
50 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p l=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=1 31 &code=mwp&p3=4.
51 Id.
52 id.
53 See id. at 207 (Higgins, J., separate opinion); id. at 219 (Kooijmans, J., separate opi-
nion); id. at 240 (Buergenthal, J., separate opinion).
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1368 and 1373, clearly evidenced that Article 51 could be invoked against
non-state actors.54 After the Kosovo intervention, NATO separated terrorist
acts from armed attacks in a strategic concept for the Alliance adopted on
April 24, 1999. Nevertheless, immediately after the attacks on 9/11, NATO
invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, calling 9/11 an armed attack
justifying individual or collective self-defense. 55
Neither of the Security Council resolutions nor NATO's September
12, 2001 statement attempted to establish a link between terrorist acts and a
particular state. The absence of such a link does not clearly indicate whether
the intention was to refer to a concept of armed attack, which would also
comprise acts which are not attributable to a state. Professor Giorgio Gaja
concluded that there was no armed attack according to current international
law.56 Consequently, those who argue that no armed attack is required to
invoke anticipatory self-defense consider anticipatory self-defense against
an imminent threat permissible.57 Others note the danger of preemptive
strikes and adhere to the view that they are unlawful.58 A third school of
thought maintains that it is in principle unlawful to exercise preemptive self-
defense, but not in all circumstances.
59
Another question is whether anticipatory or preemptive self-defense
could be considered lawful in the aftermath of 9/11. However, as Professor
Thomas Franck correctly noted there is nothing in the "Travaux Pr~para-
toires" or in the text of the Charter to justify the claim that self-defense is
14 See id. at 215-16 (Higgins, J., separate opinion); id. at 229-30 (Kooijmans, J., separate
opinion); id. at 241-43 (Buergenthal, J., separate opinion).
55 North American Treaty Organization [NATO], Statement by the North Atlantic Council
(Sept. 12, 2001), compiled in 40 I.L.M. 1267 (2001).
56 See Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense Was There An Armed Attack?, in EUR. J. INT'L L.
DISCUSSION FORUM, THE ATTACK OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, avail-
able at http://www.ejil.org/forum.
57 See ROBERT JENNINGS, ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 534-35
(1996). Compare William Taft, John Yoo, Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: Future Implications of
the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557-85 n.3 (2003) (discussing the legality of preemptive
self-defense), with Miriam Sapiro, Tom Farer, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Con-
flict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 599-628 (2003) (opposing the legality of preemptive self-
defense). See also Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Mili-
tary Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 89-103 (2003) (considering preemptive strikes lawful).
58 See Christine Gray, The U.S. National Security Strategy and the New "Bush Doctrine"
of Preemptive Self-defense, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 437, 442-43 (2002); Mary Ellen O'Connell,
The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. at 2-3 (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
59 See Sarah Scheidman, Standards to Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50
SYRACUSE L. REv. 249,270 (2000); Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case
for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 565 (2002);
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 559, 564-65 (1999).
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justified after an attack ends. Franck maintains that the assertion that self-
defense required immediate action stems from a misunderstanding of the
Caroline decision which deals only with anticipatory self-defense. 60 Profes-
sor W. Michael Reisman considered that the international legal test of the
lawfulness of preemptive action presumably hinges on two questions: "the
right to act (jus ad bellum); and if that were established, the necessity and
proportionality of the action, as well as the capacity of the weapons chosen
for the action to discriminate between belligerents and non-belligerents.,
61
It is important to distinguish between the situation immediately af-
ter the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. strategy "Enduring Freedom."
The U.S.' idea of "going it alone" vitiates the Charter's provisions regarding
preemptive force. In cases of lacking objective evidence of an armed attack,
the Charter requires multilateral decision-making. 62 Permitting preemptive
self-defense at the sole discretion of one state is fundamentally at odds with
the underlying ideas of the Charter.63 As Professor Louis Henkin wrote in
1987:
It is not in the interest of the U.S. to reconstruct the law of the Charter so
as to dilute and confuse its normative prohibitions. In our decentralized in-
ternational political system with primitive institutions and underdeveloped
law enforcement machinery, it is important that Charter norms, which go
to the heart of the international order and implicate war and peace in the
nuclear age, be clear, sharp and comprehensive; as independent as possible
of judgements of degree and of issues of fact; as invulnerable as can be to
a self-serving interpretation and to temptations to conceal, or mischaracter-
ize events. Extending the meaning of "armed attack" and of "self-defense,"
multiplying exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force and the occa-
sions that would permit military intervention, would undermine the law of
the Charter and the international order in the wake of world war.
6 4
Even if one were to admit that customary international law requires
a certain degree of timelessness, as Professor Edward McWhinney defends,
60 Thomas F. Frank, Terrorism and the Right of Self Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839
(2001). See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY supra note 25. See
also C. Stahn, Nicaragua is Dead, Long Live Nicaragua-The Right to Self-Defence Under
Article 51 of the UN Charter and International Terrorism, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE
FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LmERTY? 827 (C. Walter et al.
eds., 2003).
61 W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L.
17 (1999). See also Steven R. Ratner, Jus as Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 905 (2002).
62 O'Connell, supra note 58, at 13.
63 Id.
64 Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 69 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1989). See generally Louis
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1979).
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the U.S.' legal and political strategy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
defeats the idea of recognition as unlawful self-defense an "indefinite war
against terrorism," as former President Bush announced in his joint state-
ment to Congress on September 20, 2001.65
In my opinion, Professor Michael Glennon best describes the cur-
rent situation. He maintains that:
The international system has come to subsist in a parallel universe of two
systems, one de jure, the other defacto. The dejure system consists of il-
lusory rules that would govern the use of force among states in a platonic
world of forms, a world that does not exist. The defacto system consists of
actual state practice in the real world, a world in which states weigh costs
against benefits in regular disregard of the rules solemnly proclaimed in
the all-but-ignored dejure system. The decaying dejure catechism is over-
ly schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behavior, and un-
realistic in its aspirations for state conduct. 66
3. State of necessity
Reference has also been made to the existence of a "state of neces-
sity" after the attacks of 9/11, which would constitute a ground for preclud-
ing the wrongfulness of an unlawful act under Article 25 of the International
Law Commission (ILC) draft articles. However, this argument cannot be
used to justify unlawful use of military force against the Taliban and al-
Qaeda after the invasion into Afghanistan because Article 26 of the ILC
draft articles excludes any justification or excuse of a breach of a state's
obligation under a peremptory norm of international law such as the prohi-
bition of the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter in accor-
dance with Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.67
Moreover, the ICJ observed that "the state of necessity is a ground recog-
nized by customary international law" that "can only be accepted on an ex-
ceptional basis.",68 Therefore, "the state of necessity can only be invoked
under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively
satisfied; and the State concerned is not the sole judge of whether
those conditions have been met.,
69
65 McWhinney, supra note 41, at 281.
66 Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539,540(2002).
67 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International
Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56 Sess., Supp. No. 10, arts. 25, 26, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001).
68 Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept. 25).
69 Id.
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Finally, a legal distinction between self-defense, which consists of
necessary and proportionate measures to protect oneself against future
threats and reprisals, which are largely punitive in character, should be
made. 70 While legitimate self-defense is permitted if it meets all the re-
quirements mentioned above, reprisals are still prohibited under the current
jus ad bellum.7
1
C. Preemption, Terrorism, and the "Bush Doctrine"
During a colloquium in 1989 on Terrorism as an International
Crime, Professor Schachter advanced four criteria where extraterritorial
force against terrorists could be considered lawful, three of which are di-
rectly relevant to assess the U.S.' hunt for terrorists in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, namely "to destroy or damage terrorist bases in another coun-
try[,] to capture or kill terrorists in another country[,] [and] to attack mili-
tary or governmental units in another country because its government ha[d]
directly or indirectly aided terrorists.
72
In the aftermath of 9/11, the war of words accompanied the war on
terror. Could the attacks on New York and Washington be legally qualified
as an act of war? President Bush stated, "Our war on terror begins with Al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. 73 However, as Professor Joan Fitzpatrick
declares:
70 HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
150 (2005).
71 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1984 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (1986). See generally FRITS KALSIIOVEN,
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971). Brun-Otto Bryde, Self-Defense, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000); Karl Josef Partsch, Reprisals,
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
72 Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another
Country, 19 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 209, 212 (1989). See also Michael Bothe, Terrorism and
the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227 (2003); Antonio Cassese, The
International Community's Legal Response to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589 (1989);
G. Guillaume, Terrorisme et Droit International, 215 HAGUE REC. 287 (1989); Jeffrey A.
McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United States Response to
Achille Lauro--Questions of Jurisdiction and its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435
(1986); W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 3 (1999); Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209
(2003); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901 (1986). But see
Federica Bisone, Killing a Fly with a Cannon: The American Response to the Embassy At-
tacks, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COM. L. 93 (2000).
73 President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 21, 2001, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/national/
21BTEX.html?pagewanted=all. See also Frrdric Mdgret, War? Some Semantics and the
Move to Violance, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 361, 384-85 (2002) (providing a philosophical analy-
sis). For an excellent survey of various legal analysis on combating terrorism, please view
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Neither "war" nor "terrorism" has a fixed meaning in contemporary inter-
national law. Post-September 11 events suggest the following possible
identities for the "war against terrorism":
[(1)] An undeclared international armed conflict by the United States
and allied states against Afghanistan
[(2)] An undeclared international armed conflict by the United States
and allied states against the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan
[(3)] An international armed conflict in Afghanistan between the
Taliban and its domestic rivals, internationalized by the intervention
in October 2001 by the United States and allied states
[(4)] An undeclared international armed conflict by the United States
and allied states against the non-state entity Al Qaeda;
[(5)] An undeclared international armed conflict by the United States
and allied states against a range of non-state entities and individuals
alleged from time to time to be international terrorists
[(6)] A continuation of crime control activities against international
terrorists, with a metaphorical use of 'war' rhetoric.
74
By declaring the U.S.' involvement in a "war on terrorism," Presi-
dent Bush refocused the nation's strategic posture from one that targeted
terrorists as criminals to one that treats terrorists and their supporting states
capable of threatening U.S. and its allies, as threats to national security.
75
Conceived as such, the current "war on terrorism" is the resurrection of an-
ticipatory self-defense outlawed in the Charter.
In his speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1,
762002, President Bush referred for the first time to preemption. However, if
we look at the language used in his speech, as well as the references, we
will in fact see that the President seemed to be describing preventive war,
not pre-emption. Bush stated that "our security will require all Americans to
be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action where
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. 77 This speech
turned out to be the forerunner to the so-called "Bush doctrine" and devel-
oped into the National Security strategy.78 There is one remarkable passage
in this strategy where it reads:
the "Terrorism On Trial" symposium organized by the Case Western Reserve University
School of Law in October 2004 and published in 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287 (2004).
74 Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human
Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 241, 249 (2003).
75 Sofaer, supra note 72.
76 Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, 38
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 944, 946 (June 1, 2002).
77 id.
78 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2.
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For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an
attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against
forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and inter-
national jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the exis-
tence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies,
navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and ob-
jectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to
attack us using conventional means....
[. .. ] To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. 7
However, in the context of preemption, the danger must be catego-
rized as technical and with a risk of severe destruction rather than just an
imminent threat. Consequently, militarily action would thus be preventive
war, not preemption.
D. Restricting Preemptive Force Against Acts of Terrorism
I agree with many scholars, including Professor Michael Bothe, that
the doctrine of preemptive strikes formulated in the U.S. National Security
Strategy-proposing to adapt this concept to new received threats any-
where-constitutes an unacceptable expansion on the right of anticipatory
self-defense. 80 It can also be conceived as a misinterpretation of the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). 81 The AUMF is not a
declaration of war, but merely the very limited authorization to use neces-
sary and appropriate force against certain persons, nations, or organizations
that were either directly involved in or aided the 9/11 attacks or that had
harbored such organizations or persons before or during the 9/11 attacks.82
Congressional use of the past tense regarding nations, organizations
or persons means that the intentional aiding or harboring must have oc-
curred before or during the 9/11 attacks. 83 The AUMF most certainly did
not authorize the war against al-Qaeda. Congress actually refused to author-
" id. at 15.
80 Bothe, supra note 72, at 232.
81 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18,
2001).
82 See id. (providing the President with the power "to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.")
83 id.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ize use of force against "acts of terrorism. ' 84 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized already in an early stage that only Congress has the con-
stitutional power to determine whether a war exists. 85 Nevertheless, the
AUMF shifts away from treating terrorism as a crime to treating terrorism
as an armed conflict which allows the U.S. to exercise force as a "funda-
mental incidence of waging war.",86 Regarding this shift, it is interesting to
note that a proposed new strategy by an American think tank, under the
heading Prevention of Terrorism, declares that the "broad concept of a 'war
on terror"' should be retired.87
III. THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE HUMAN
RIGHTS RECORD OF ITS VICTIMS
Although the first part of this article had a rather doctrinal approach
to the questions under consideration, the second part will be more practical.
However, in view of the many aspects of the human rights violations as a
consequence of the Bush doctrine and the subsequent rise of the "war on
terror," this section is also much more cursory.
A. Military Commissions and the Law of War
The decision to bring presumed terrorists captured during the after-
math of the 9/11 attacks and during the "Enduring Freedom" campaign be-
fore U.S. military tribunals has aroused much global debate. Already in
191 1,General Henry Halleck observed that military commissions "are estab-
lished by the President, by virtue of his war power as commander-in-chief,
and have jurisdiction of cases arising under the laws of war; courts martial
exist in peace and war, but military commissions are war courts and can
exist only in time of war.",88 Military Commissions consequently implicate a
84 See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and the Use of Force: Legal and
Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43
HARV. INT'L L.J. 71, 74 (2002) (explaining that the AUMF is not a declaration of war). See
also Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1872-73 (2004); Jordan Paust,
Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret
Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L.R.
345 (2007); JORDAN PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007); Jordan Paust, Use of Armed Force Against
Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 535 n.3 (2002).
85 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
86 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). For a discussion of what constitutes
a "fundamental incident of waging war," please see the debate transcript of Professor David
D. Cole and Professor Ruth Wedgwood in 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509 (2006).
87 PHILIP J. CROWLEY, SAFE AT HOME: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO PROTECT
THE AMERICAN HOMELAND, THE REAL CENTRAL FRONT 3 (2008).
88 Henry Wager Halleck, Military Tribunals and Their Jurisdiction, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 958,
965-66(1911).
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certain tension in the power of Congress to declare war and the power of the
President of the U.S. as Commander-in-Chief to define offences against the
law of nations in conformity with Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
Among these fundamental war powers is the authority to detain enemy per-
sonnel for the duration of hostilities, to subject law of war violators to trials
in military tribunals, and to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the full
scope of the law, rather than over only those offences defined in U.S. crimi-
nal statutes. 90
Invoking the legal advantages of the law of war is not a one-way
street, however. As Justice Anthony Kennedy noted in his concurring opin-
ion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which overruled the initial Guantdnamo mili-
tary commission procedure: 91
The Government does not claim to base the charges against Hamdan on a
statute; instead it invokes the law of war. That law, as the Court explained
in [Ex parte Quirin], derives from "rules and precepts of the law of na-
tions"; it is the body of international law governing armed conflict. If the
military commission at issue is illegal under the law of war, then an of-
fender cannot be tried "by the law of war" before that commission. 92
It should be recalled that the initial Military Order confused the role
of legislator, policeman, prosecutor, judge, and court of appeals, by concen-
trating many powers of the U.S. government in the Executive Branch.
93
89 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
90 See Hamdi, 124 U.S. at 2640-41 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942));
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Ter-
rorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047, 2085 (2005); David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Meas-
ures?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military Commission Procedure, 24
B.U. INT'L L.J. 55 (2006); David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the
Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 5 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Interna-
tional Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2653,
2654-58 (2005). See also Johannes van Aggelen, supra note 10, at 95-106.
91 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
92 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 641 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Matthias H6pfner, Quirin, Ex Parte, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2000).
93 Supra note 91. See, e.g., Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting
Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and
Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defence of Military Commissions and the United States
Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591
(2002); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terorism, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 345 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contra-
dictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635 (2002); Harold
Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (2002); Daryl
A. Mundis, Agora: Military Commissions: The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute
Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320 (2002); Diane F. Orenlicher &
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Professor Neal Katyal, lead counsel in the Hamdan case, correctly stated
that, "the Bush Administration has sought to convert the singular Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause into a textual warrant for exceptional unilateral-
ism."' 94 The initial military order was subsequently implemented by various
military orders prepared by the DOD, starting with DOD Military Commis-
sion Order No.1, dated March 21, 2002. 95 On January 31, 2005, a new mili-
tary order, also named "No. 1," was issued to overhaul the previous order.96
However, it was a kind of window dressing and new wine in old bottles. As
Professor David Glazier stated:
The transition from treating terrorism as a crime to treating terrorism as an
armed conflict poses a unique set of legal challenges. One particularly
daunting issue is identifying specifically which rules contained in the myr-
iad of treaties and customary provisions that comprise the corpus juris of
the law of war apply to a "war on terror." Traditionally, conflicts have
been characterized as either "international" or "non-international," with
distinct sets of rules applicable to each. International armed conflicts are
fought between nation states, while non-international armed conflicts are
contests between a nation state and armed groups seeking independence or
regime change within its borders. Combating terrorism, however, has a
number of unique characteristics that prevent its inclusion in either cate-
gory. The Bush Administration seemingly has taken full advantage of
these distinctions by re-characterizing terrorism as armed conflict and at-
tempting to avoid the application of international standards to its treatment
of detainees.
The conduct of the Guantanamo military commissions prior to Hamdan III
exemplifies this effort to avoid international law constraints.
97
Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military
Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2002); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terror-
ism and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002).
94 Neal Katyal & Lawrence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tri-
bunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1269 (2002).
95 U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order 1, Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 2 1,
2001), available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. See also Jordan
Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 677 (2002) (providing a very critical analysis).
96 U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order 1, Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Aug. 31,
2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d2OO5O902order.pdf.
97 Glazier, supra note 90, at 58 (citations omitted). See also Paul E. Kantwill & Sean
Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or "Extra-conventional Persons: " How Unlawful Comba-
tants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and
Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 681 (2005).
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Nevertheless, detainees are protected by the following Third Ge-
neva Convention articles: 4 (categories of POWs), 5 (status), 12 (responsi-
bility of treatment by the Detaining Power, 13 (humane treatment), 46 (con-
ditions of transfers of prisoners of war), 84 and 102 (trial procedures and
guarantees), 118 (release and repatriation), and 130 (grave breaches of the
convention). In addition, the following articles of Protocol I are relevant:
Arts. 43-45 (combatants' prisoner-of-war status) and Article 75 (fundamen-
tal guarantees). 98Additionally, detainees are also protected by Article 3
(Common Article 3), which is common to all four conventions and reflects
customary international law. This fact was even admitted by the Bush ad-
ministration in a document declassified three years after the date of issue. In
a letter from J. Yoo to W. Taft IV dated March 28, 2002, reference is made
to an earlier memorandum prepared by Taft where it is admitted "that all
combatants are entitled, as a minimum to the guarantees of article 3" and
"that it is widely recognized internationally that Common Article 3 reflects
minimum customary international law standards for both internal and inter-
national armed conflicts." 99 Under the Geneva Conventions, any person not
a prisoner of war has rights under the Geneva civilian convention, and there
is no gap in the reach of at least some form of protection and rights of per-
sons. l00 In the ongoing battle to obtain recognition of the so-called Ge-
neva rights for the Guantinamo detainees, Judge Reggie Walton on March
3, 2009 called for new briefings on whether the Geneva Conventions apply
to Guantdinamo, and whether violation of those rights can be challenged in
federal habeas cases.' 0' Walton also requested briefings on whether the de-
tainees were entitled to "a certain minimum standard of care" even if the
Geneva rights do not apply, and whether a judge has any authority to decide
a habeas challenge to conditions of confinement. 102 On March 19, 2009 the
98 ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, UNPRIVILEGED COMBATANTS AND THE
HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, (AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM
Dec. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf. See S. Vladeck, Policy
Comment: A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 US.C. § 4001(a) and the Detention of US.
Citizen "Enemy Combatants", 112 YALE L.J. (2003); JENNIFER K. ELSEA, DETENTION OF
AMERICAN CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS, at CRS-6 (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31724.pdf.
99 Jordan Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Con-
cerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 816-
17 n. 19 (2005) (citation omitted).
100 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 334 F. Supp.2d. 152, 161-62 (D.D.C. 2004); Paust, supra note
99, at 850-51; Johannes van Aggelen, A Response to John C. Yoo, "The Status of Soldiers
and Terrorists Under the Geneva Convention" 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 167, 176-77 (2005).
1o1 Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/a-new-test-
on-geneva-rights/ (Mar. 19, 2009, 20:53).
102 Id.
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detainees' lawyers argued that the Conventions apply to Guantdnamo, that
U.S. courts may enforce those rights, and that the detainees should either be
transferred to another country or sent to their home countries if the U.S.
military is unwilling to obey the Conventions. 10 3 The document also argued
that detainees are prisoners of war because even though the military de-
signed them as "enemy combatants," that designation is insufficient to sat-
isfy the Geneva Convention on POW rights.'04 The test and history of the
habeas statute and the Supremacy Clause in addition to several tests that
courts have developed for determining whether a treaty can be enforced, all
show that rights under the Third Geneva Convention can be enforced in
habeas cases. 105
Lawyers for the U.S. government have constantly argued that the
establishment of military commissions was a lawful implementation of Ar-
ticle 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, but this argument is incorrect. A
legal clash between lawyers for the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the
DOD, and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) occurred in January 2002,
where opportunistic arguments were put forth to deny protection under the
Third Geneva Convention and the conflict with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Denying protection would substantially reduce the threat of domestic crimi-
nal prosecution under the War Crimes Act. 106 The War Crimes Act prohibits
the commission of war crimes by or against a U.S. citizen and also governs
U.S. officials. 10 7 War crimes include any grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention or any violation of Common Article 3. 108 Moreover, the Geneva
Conventions are self-executing as the War Crimes Act explicitly incorpo-
rates the Geneva Conventions in U.S. domestic law. 109
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions on the Law of War
In order to better understand the implications for victims of the jug-
gling of the U.S. administration after Supreme Court review, three landmark
judgments rendered in 2004, 2006, and 2008 will be discussed which have
fundamentally shaken the legal parameters and twice forced Congress to
103 See Reply Brief of Petitioners, El Falesteny, et al. v. Obama, No. 05-02386 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 19, 2009). This is the lead case in the more than thirty six consolidated cases on this
issue in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. See also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 782 (1988);
David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Decla-
rations andHuman Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 136-37 (1999).
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adapt itself to a new situation, although it did not substantially change the
fundamental violations of the law of war.
1. The Hamdi case
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen born in Louisi-
ana from Saudi parents, was captured in Afghanistan in April 2002 by the
Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban
government, and was handed over to U.S. military forces and transported to
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.'1 10 When the government realized that Hamdi was
born in the U.S., it transferred him to a naval station in Norfolk, Virginia."'
He was classified by the government as an "enemy combatant"--a term
absent in international law and invented by the Bush Administration" 2-
and held in incommunicado detention. 113 The district court ruled that the
government had insufficient proof to support his continued detention. 114 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that although it had juris-
diction to consider Hamdi's application, he had been caught in an active
combat zone and, therefore, no further factual enquiry or hearing was con-
sidered necessary or proper.' 15
Hamdi subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 1 16 The
two issues at stake were whether the government had any lawful power to
detain U.S. citizens in circumstances such as Hamdi's and, if the govern-
ment did have such a power, what rights the person so detained had to con-
test the lawfulness of the exercise of that power. 117 Four justices held that
the government had been granted authority by Congress to detain citizens,
but constitutional Due Process guarantees required that citizens so detained
be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis of their deten-
tion before a neutral decision-maker and the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals was set aside." 8 Two other justices held that Hamdi's detention had
not been authorized by Congress and that Hamdi had to be given a meaning-
110 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.2d 527, 529 (E.D. Va. 2002).
111 Id.
112 See Gabor Rona, Enemy Combatants in the "War on Terror?" A Case Study of How
Myopic Lawyering Makes Bad Law, 30 SECURrrY L. REP. 1, 1-8 (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/nslr/2007/APIABANSLRNewsletter 69016.pdf;
David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Combatant Status Under the Laws of War, 30
SECuJRiT L. REP. 1, 1-8 (2008) (discussing his difference of opinion with Rona).
... Hamdi, 243 F. Supp.2d. at 530.
"4 Id. at 535-36.
15 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
116 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
"' Id. at 515-17.
18Id. at 508.
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ful opportunity to offer evidence that he was not an enemy combatant. 19
Justice Scalia dissented that the failure of the government to charge Hamdi
with treason or some other criminal offence meant that he had to be re-
leased. 120 Justice Clarence Thomas held that the government had complied
with the Due Process rights under the Constitution and that the Executive
Branch was entitled to detain Hamdi irrespective of congressional
authorization. 
121
The overall result of this somewhat complex array of opinions was
that Hamdi's constitutional Due Process rights were violated because had
not been given the opportunity to effectively challenge the legality of his
detention. If one considers in detail the findings of the Supreme Court, one
nevertheless comes to the conclusion that the court failed to define the term
"enemy combatant." 122 After the DOD became clearly embarrassed with
the U.S.' alleged torture practices in 2005, Senator John McCain introduced
an amendment to the Defence Appropriations Bill for the 2006 fiscal
year. 123 In early November 2005, two other senators, Lindsey Graham and
Jon Kyl, proposed an amendment to review detention of enemy combatants,
which led to an outcry as it provided that no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
on behalf of an alien detained as an enemy combatant by the U.S. govern-
ment or any other action challenging any aspect of the detention of an alien
who was detained by the Secretary of Defense as an enemy combatant. 124
The amendment nevertheless passed with forty-nine to forty-two votes as it
would strengthen Senate oversight over Guantdnamo operations. 12 5
The subsequent compromise linked legislation proposed by Senator
Graham, which would deny detainees broad access to federal courts, with a
new amendment that would grant detainees the right to appeal the verdict of
a military tribunal to a federal appeals court. 126 It would imply that the con-
stitutional right of habeas corpus be abolished, but appeals to the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia would be possible to ascertain: (1)
whether the status determination by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSTR) applied the correct standards and was consistent with the proce-
119 Id
120 Id at 571.
121 Id. at 594.
122 See Peter Jan Honigsbeg, Chasing "Enemy Combatants'" and Circumventing Interna-
tional Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 54-56
(2007) (providing an excellent appraisal of the term "enemy combatant").
123 See Ariel Meyerstein, Note, The Law of Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 299, 336 (2007).
124 151 CONG. REc. S 12,667 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005).
125 Id. (statement of Sen. Viuer).
126 151 CONG. REc. S12,754 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005).
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dures specified by the Secretary of Defense, including the requirement that
the tribunal's conclusion be supported by a preponderance of evidence and
allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the U.S. government's evi-
dence; and (2) whether subjecting an alien enemy combatant to such stan-
dards and procedures is consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the
U.S.
Former president Bush signed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)
into law on December 30, 2005.127 The bone of contention became section
1005(e), which amended 28 U.S.C § 2241 by providing that "no court, jus-
tice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider [ ] an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of alien detained by the De-
partment of Defense at Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba" and that the D.C. circuit
had exclusive jurisdiction to review CSTR decisions. 128
2. The Hamdan case
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Salim Hamdan, Bin Laden's alleged body-
guard and personal driver, was seized in Afghanistan in November 2001,
charged with conspiring with Bin Laden and deemed by the President as
eligible for trial by a military commission.1 29 The Supreme Court consid-
ered three fundamental questions in Hamdan: (1) whether the U.S. govern-
ment is bound by the Geneva Conventions when dealing with "enemy com-
batants"; (2) whether the Executive Branch's establishment of new judicial
processes to try Guantdinamo detainees was consistent with the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the AUMF; and (3) whether the conspiracy at
issue could be punished as a war crime. 130 By a five to three majority deci-
sion, Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hamdan. 131 The plurality ruling, writ-
ten by Justice John Stevens, contained the following conclusions: (1) the
Geneva Conventions protect "enemy combatants"; 132 (2) President Bush did
127 See Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). See also MICHAEL J.
GARCIA, CONG. RES. SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES:
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT 1, n.1 (Jan. 23, 2009), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33655_20090123.pdf.
18 Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
129 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006).
30 Id. at 598-600.
131 Id. at 636. For an excellent, contextual analysis that takes into account law of war issues
as well as human rights issues, see generally AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
JUSTICE AT LAST OR MORE OF THE SAME? DETENTIONS AND TRIALS AFTER HAMDAN V.
RUMSFELD, Al Index: AMR 51/146/2006, Sept. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/146/2006/en/150e86d3-d3f3-11 dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/amr511462006en.pdf.
.32 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 619.
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not have authority under the AUMF to create military tribunals;' 33 (3) the
establishment of the military commissions violated UMCJ Article 36(b) as
well as Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; 134 (4) the alleged
conspiracy did not qualify as a war crime; 135 and (5) procedures devised for
the military commissions differed from those for courts-martial, in that the
former could hear evidence that is inadmissible in the latter and can also
exclude defendants from the proceedings.' 
36
On August 6, 2008, following a two-week military commission
trial, a military judge convicted Hamdan on five of eight counts of provid-
ing material support to terrorism but acquitted him of the more serious
charge of conspiracy. 137 His trial was the first to be completed under the
system of military commissions authorized under the MCA of 2006.138
Hamdan obtained a light five-month sentence due to his lengthy previous
incarceration and he was released in late 2008.139
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court erred again in the Hamdan case
when it accepted the administration's term "enemy combatant" without at-
tempting to come up with a legal definition. 140 The Supreme Court's error
was compounded when Congress passed the Military Commissions Act
(MCA) in October 2006, statutorily defining the term "enemy combatant"
for the first time. 141
133 Id. at 593-95.
134 Id. at 616, 625.
131 Id. at 600.
136 Jay Dealy, Subordination of Powers: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1071, 1073 (2007). See also Helen Keller & Magdalena Forowicz,
A New Era for the Supreme Court After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 67 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 1
(2007); F. de. Londras, U.S. Supreme Court, 29 June 2006, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct.
2749 (2006), 54 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 539, 539-50 (2007).
137 John Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Hamdan Convicted of Lesser Offense
in First Full Military Commission Trial, Sentenced to Time Served Plus Five Months, 102
AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 873-74 (2008) (citing William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden
Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at Al; Jerry Markon, Hamdan Guilty of
Terror Support, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2008, at A1).
138 Crook, supra note 137.
139 Josh White and William Branigin, Hamdan to Be Sent to Yemen; Bin Laden Driver
Spent 7 Years at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, at Al.
140 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 606 (2006) ("The facts the Court deemed
sufficient for this purpose were that the defendants, admitted enemy combatants, entered
upon U.S. territory in time of war ... ").
141 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, § 948a, 120 Stat. 2600,
2601.
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As summarized in a report by Amnesty International, the main fea-
tures of the MCA are the following: 142
0 It authorizes the President to establish military commissions for
the prosecution of certain offenses committed by alien unlawful
combatants. 1
43
* It prescribes the procedure and substantive law to be applied by the
commissions. 144
* It permits civilian capture far from any battlefield to be tried by mili-
tary commissions rather than civilian courts, contradicting international
standards and case law. 
145
o It entitles military commissions to hand out death sentences in contra-
vention of international standards, which only permit capital punishment
after trials affording "all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial."
' 146
e It prohibits the U.S. courts from using international law to inform their
decisions relating to the War Crimes Act. 1
47
* It narrows the scope of the U.S. War Crimes Act by not expressly
criminalizing acts that constitute "outrageous acts upon personal dignity,
particularly humiliating and degrading treatment" as prohibited under Ar-
ticle 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. 1
48
* It retroactively eliminates the right of habeas corpus for alien enemy
combatants detained by the U.S.-either lawfully or unlawfully. 1
49
e It extends the prohibition under U.S. law on cruel, inhumane, or de-
grading treatment or punishment to encompass all those in the custody or
under the physical control the U.S. regardless of their nationality or physi-
cal location. 1
50
* It limits the ability of individuals to invoke the Geneva Conventions as
a source of rights in certain proceedings. 151
142 See AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF
2006-TURNING BAD POLICY INTO BAD LAW, AMR 51/154/2006, Sept. 29, 2006 [hereinafter
Amnesty Int'l, Bad Policy], available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
AMR51/154/2006. See also George P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427, 427-67 (2007).
141 Amnesty Int'l, Bad Policy, supra note 142, at 8.
'44 id.
145 Id.
146 id.
141 Id. at 9.
148 Id. at 8.
149 Id. at 7-8.
15o See generally id.
' Id. at 8.
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* It purports to authoritatively interpret the Geneva Conventions and to
delegate further authority to the U.S. Executive Branch. 152
A subsequent amendment proposed by Senator Christopher Dodd,
and introduced under the title "Effective Terrorist Prosecution Act," pro-
vided that "the term 'unlawful enemy combatant' means an individual who
directly participates in hostilities as part of an armed conflict against the
United States and who is not a lawful enemy combatant. The term was used
solely to designate individuals triable by military commissions under this
chapter." 153 In comparison to the MCA definition, the key here is the re-
quirement of direct participation and the dropping of coverage for those
engaged in conflict not against the U.S., but against the U.S. allies.
During 2008, criticism of the military commission procedures at
Guantdmamo increased enormously as one of the Commissions' military and
defense lawyers called the command structure corrupt. 154 Several legal
scholars, including a former academic consultant to the Commission's chief
prosecutor, Professor Gregory McNeal, maintained that the structure and
rules of the commissions, as crafted by the DOD, "allowed for political ma-
nipulation of nearly all aspects of the trials." 1
55
In proceedings before lower courts and rulings by judges at military
commission sessions, the exchange with the administration on the definition
of the term "unlawful combatant" continued. In a ruling on a defense mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the government,
Military Judge Stephen Henley stated that:
The government has not cited any persuasive authority for the proposition
that acting as an unlawful enemy combatant, by itself, is a violation of the
laws of war .... In other words, that the accused might fail to qualify as a
lawful combatant does not automatically lead to the conclusion that his
conduct violated the law of war and the propriety of the charges in this
152 Id. at 9.
151 S. 4060, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/
doddI 1 1606.html.
154 See, e.g., Andy Worthington, New Evidence of Systemic Bias in Guantinamo Trials
(Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2008/10/10/new-evidence-of-systemic-
bias-in-guantanamo-trials/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
155 Id. On October 8, 2009, the House of Representatives approved amendments to the
MCA. It seeks to introduce limitations on the use of hearsay and coerced testimony and
greater access to evidence. However, the amendments fail to address many of the flaws in the
system as indicated by human rights advocates. In early November 2009, President Obama
signed the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which included a package of changes
in the rules governing military commission proceedings. See Joanne Mariner, A First Look at
the Military Commissions Act of 2009, FINDLAW, Nov. 4, 2009, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/
mariner/20091104.html. Called the Military Commissions Act of 2009, the new law replaces
and improves upon the Bush Military Commissions Act 2006. See Military Commissions Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
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case must be based on the nature of the act, not simply on the status of the
accused. 156
3. Boumediene and follow-up
The latest battle, where the Supreme Court once more ruled in favor
of the victims of the Bush administration, concerned a writ of habeas corpus
in a civilian court in the U.S. on behalf of Lakdar Boumediene, held in mili-
tary detention by the U.S. at Guantdnamo Bay.157 The case challenged the
legality of Boumediene's detention as well as the constitutionality of the
MCA.' 58 On June 12, 2008, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held
that prisoners had the right to habeas corpus under the U.S. Constitution and
that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of that right. 159 The Court
in particular considered Section 7 of the MCA unconstitutional, which in
fact has the same effect as Section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA). 160 The Court held that, "Congress intended the DTA and the MCA
to circumscribe habeas review ... limiting the Court of Appeals' jurisdic-
tion to assessing whether the CSTR complied with the 'standards and pro-
cedures specified by the Secretary of Defense."",16' Specifically, the Court
explained that:
At the CSRT stage the detainee has limited means to find or present evi-
dence to challenge the Government's case, does not have the assistance of
counsel, and may not be aware of the most critical allegations that the
Government relied upon to order his detention. His opportunity to confront
witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real, given that there are no
limits on the admission of hearsay. The Court therefore agrees with peti-
tioners that there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of
fact. And given that the consequence of error may be detention for the du-
ration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too sig-
nificant to ignore. 1
62
The Court also concluded that the detainees are not required to exhaust re-
view procedures in the Court of Appeals before pursuing habeas corpus
156 Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss-Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, United
States v. Jawad (Military Comm'n, GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba) (Sept. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/RULING%20D-007%20(subject%20matter/ 20
jurisdiction)%20(2).pdf.
157 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2236-38 (2008).
158 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 1005(e), 120 Stat. 2600.
159 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2234.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 2237.
162 Id. at 2238.
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actions in the district courts as the CSTR was considered
inadequate. 163
This third judgment against the government in almost five years
hopefully has a positive bearing upon future litigation by so-called enemy
combatants and other prisoners, whether taken on or off the battlefield. It is
my sincere hope that Congress will no longer interfere in this matter.
Subsequently, this case was sent back to the D.C. circuit. In October
2008, the petitioners presented a memorandum regarding the definition of
enemy combatant.1 64 They argued that an "enemy combatant" is either a
member of a state military that is engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or a
civilian directly participating in hostilities against the U.S. as part of an or-
ganized armed force. 165 Only such people are on the "battlefield" and may
be legitimately "removed" from it by use of military force, and the govern-
ment had failed to show that petitioners fell into either category.166 The
government immediately reacted by presenting the respondent's memoran-
dum on the definition. 167 The government requested the D.C. Circuit Court
to reject the petitioners' effort to place crippling jurisdictional limits on the
U.S.' authority to detain militarily members or supporters of al-Qaida's
terrorist network, the Taliban, or associated forces. 168 The government ar-
gued that U.S. authority to detain individuals classified as "enemy combat-
ants" was based on the AUMF enacted by Congress in the immediate after-
math of the 9/11 attacks, the traditional law of war principles, and the Presi-
dent's authority under the U.S. Constitution as Commander-in-Chief. 169 The
judge assigned to the case, Judge Richard Leon, subsequently issued a
memorandum order in which he stated that the issue before the court was
what definition of "enemy combatant" should be employed in the upcoming
hearings.' 70 He referred to the definition used in the MCA where the term
"unlawful enemy combatant" specifically provides that it includes persons
163 Id. See also Robert M. Chesney, Judicial Review, Combatant Status Determinations,
and the Possible Consequences of Boumediene, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 62, 62-68 (2007) (pro-
viding a succinct appraisal of consequences of possible outcomes of the case and the role of
the CSRT).
164 Petitioners' Memorandum Regarding the Definition of "Enemy Combatant", Boumedi-
ene v. Bush, Civil Action No. 04-cv- 1166 (RJL) (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/boumediene-enemycombatantbrief.pdf.
165 Id. at 2.
'66 Id. at 21.
167 Respondents' Memorandum Addressing the Definition of Enemy Combatant, Boumedi-
ene v. Bush, Civil Action No. 04-cv-1 166 (RJL) (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/1 0/govt-memo-on-encom- 10-22-
08.pdf.
168 Id. at 2.
169 Id. at 2-3.
170 Bournediene v. Bush, 583 F.Supp.2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008).
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who had been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Com-
batant Status Review Tribunal (CSTR) or another competent tribunal estab-
lished under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
17 1
Judge Leon held that:
An "enemy combatant" is an individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostili-
ties against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hos-
tilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 172
As has so often been the case, petitioners have to overcome another
hurdle, namely the government's defense that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. In the recent case of Bismullah v. Gates, the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals rejected a request by petitioners to review the determination by the
CSTR that they were "enemy combatants." 173 The court rejected petitioners'
request for review "because the provision of the [Detainee Treatment Act of
2005] that grants us subject matter jurisdiction cannot be severed from the
provision eliminating habeas corpus jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional in [Boumediene v. Bush].' 74 On January 22, 2009,
Judge John Bates invited the new administration to revise the government's
position on the substantive scope of the government's military detention
authority. 175 The Bush administration's position, adopted by Judge Leon in
the habeas petitions before him, was that the CSTR definition of "enemy
combatant" sufficed. The Obama administration responded to Bates' invita-
tion and requested the court to adjudicate the scope of the government's
detention authority based on the specific facts of four cases at the merits
stage, rather than attempting to abstractly define the scope of detention au-
thority at the preliminary stage. 176 The new administration also argued that
"[r]eserving legal rulings on the scope of the government's detention au-
thority ... until presented with concrete facts in particular cases ... is also
consistent with the 'prudent and incremental' approach these cases should
receive." 1
77
171 Id. (citing Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600).
172 Id. at 135.
173 551 F.3d 1068, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
174 Id. at 1070.
175 Hamlily v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-0763 (JDB), available at https://ecf.dcd.
uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/showjpublicdoc?2005cv2378-175.
176 Government's Response to the Court's Order of January 22, 2009 Regarding the Defini-
tion of Enemy Combatant, Hamlily v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-0763 (JDB) at 5 (Feb. 9,
2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/obama-
admin-reply-re-enemy-2-9-09.pdf.
177 Id. at 4.
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On March 13, 2009, the new administration redefined its position
with regard to detainee litigation in one hundred and twenty one consoli-
dated cases. 178 It stated that habeas petitions should be adjudicated under the
following definitional framework:
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those respon-
sible for those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain per-
sons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a
belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy
armed forces. 179
The memorandum was accompanied by a declaration of the new Attorney
General reiterating the content of the two relevant Executive
Orders. 180
A change with respect to the position taken by the Bush Admini-
stration is that the word "substantially" proceeds the word "supported."'
' 81
However, the government admits that the word "substantial" is not crystal
clear and concludes that "the contours of the 'substantial support' and 'as-
sociated forces' bases of detention will need to be further developed in their
application to concrete facts in individual cases."'1
82
There are more differences with respect to the previous administra-
tion. The President's authority to hold the detainees no longer flows from
some inherent constitutional authority, but from the statute passed by Con-
gress (the AUMF). 183 In addition, the meaning and limits of the AUMF are
necessarily informed by the principles of the laws of war.' 8 4 That means
international law matters in interpreting the scope of domestic law. 8 5 How-
178 Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative
to Detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Civil
Action No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf [hereinafter Detention Authority].
"9 Id. at 1-2.
180 Declaration of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH), 3-8 (Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/documents/ag-declaration.pdf.
181 Detention Authority, supra note 178.
182 Id. at 3.
183 Posting of Deborah Pearlstein to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/03/13/no-
more-%E2%80%9Cenemy-combatants%E2%80%9D/ (Mar. 13, 2009 16:48) (last visited
Sept. 26, 2009) (discussing Detention Authority, supra note 178, at 6-7).
184 Pearlstein, supra note 183 (discussing Detention Authority, supra note 178, at 6-7).
185 Pearlstein, supra note 183.
[Vol. 42:21
2009] CONSEQUENCES OF UNLAWFUL PREEMPTION 51
ever, critics correctly point out that although the word "enemy combatants"
is not used in the latest governmental submission, it seems that the current
position in essence is a modified continuation of the previous administration
and, therefore, it has been dubbed "old wine in new bottles."'1 86 This posi-
tion was also taken in a joint memorandum by petitioners in reply to the
respondents' memorandum of March 13, 2009.187 This memorandum re-
quested the Court to decline to rule that respondents' claim of detention
powers was authorized by the AUMF.188
4. The Al-Marri case
A brief discussion of the Al-Marri case is warranted in view of the
fact that President Obama ordered a separate review of Ali Al-Marri's de-
tention upon taking office. 189 Obama requested this review because Al-
Marri was held as the only enemy combatant by the DOD in U.S. detention
facilities. 190 Since he was not held at Guantdinamo Bay, Al-Marri was not
covered by the review mandated in the Review and Disposition Order,
"which mandate[ed] a review . . . of the status of all individuals that the
Department of Defense is... detaining at the Guantinamo Bay Naval Base,
in order to effect their prompt and appropriate disposition."'19'
Al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar and legal U.S. resident, was arrested in
Illinois in 2001 as a material witness by the FBI. 92 Shortly before his
criminal trial was to start in 2003, former President Bush, declared him an
"enemy combatant."' 93 President Obama's office of legal counsel reached
the conclusion that the President could no longer detain Al-Marri militarily,
and he was subsequently charged criminally. The Government's reply brief
186 See, e.g., id. See also Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/us-defines-its-claim-to-detention-power/ (Mar. 13, 2009 15:04); Marko
Milanovic, The Obama Administration's Total Misinterpretation of IHL Regarding the Au-
thority to Detain Suspected Terrorists, EJIL: TALK!, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.ejiltalk.org/
the-obama-administrations-total-misinterpretation-of-ihl-regarding-the-authority-to-detain-
suspected-terrorists/.
187 Petitioners' Joint Memorandum in Reply to Respondents' Memorandum of March 13,
2009, Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp.2d 43, LEXIS 3469 (D.C.C. 2009).
188 Id. at 24.
189 Press Release, Memorandum for the Attorney General on Review of Detention of Ali
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
office/ReviewoftheDetentionofAliSalehKahlah/.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674 (D.S.C. 2005); Brennan Center for
Justice, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
al mani v pucciarelli/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
193 United States v. Al-Marri, 274 F.Supp. 2d 1003, 1004 (C.D. Il. 2003). See also Bren-
nan Center for Justice, supra note 192.
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was due on March 23, 2009 and oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court
were rescheduled for April 27, 2009. On March 6, 2009, the Supreme Court,
at the request of the Obama administration, dismissed the case as Moot. 194
This unfortunate decision once more prevents the Supreme Court from
pronouncing its views on the concept of what constitutes an "enemy
combatant."
President Obama immediately issued three executive orders, which,
at first glance, give the impression of a total change in policy. The first or-
der, "Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantdnamo
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities," 195 contains the follow-
ing important elements:
* "[W]ithin the United States and internationally, prompt and appropriate
disposition of the individuals currently detained the United States .... 
196
* "[Cllosure of the facilities in which they are detained would further the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the
interests of justice." The individuals detained at GuantAnamo have the
constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.197
* "It is in the interests of the United States to review whether and how
any such individuals can and should be prosecuted."'
198
* During the review period, "all proceedings of such military commis-
sions to which charges have been referred but in which no judgment has
been rendered, and all proceedings pending in the United States Court of
Military Commission Review, are halted." 199
194 Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Al-Marri Detention Case Vacated (Mar. 6,
2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/almarridetention_
casevacated/. A criminal charge under American law renders a civil habeas corpus action
moot.
195 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.
fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo- 13492.pdf.
196 Id.
197 The case managers in the Guantinamo litigation process filed exhibits of detainees with
pending habeas corpus petitions on January 21, 2009. See Respondents' Notice of Filing of
Detainee Information Pursuant to the Court's January 14, 2009 Order, In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litigation (D.C.C. 2009), Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH), available at http://www.
pegc.us/archive/In re GitmoII/govrespdet info_20090121 .pdf.
198 Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 195, at 4,898.
199 Id. at 4,899. In a separate development, the Obama administration immediately re-
quested on January 20, 2009 a one-hundred and twenty day suspension of legal proceedings
against detainees at GuantAnamo Bay, including the presumed master minds of the 9/11
attacks. The military judge subsequently granted the motion on January 21, 2009. See Human
Rights Watch, US: Obama Calls for 120-Day Halt to Guantanamo Military Commissions,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/21/us-obama-calls- 120-day-halt-guantanamo-military-
commissions?print (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
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Nevertheless, on March 10, 2009, in defiance of President Obama's
order, military Judge Col. Stephen R. Henley accepted a legal pleading filed
by the five master minds of the 9/11 attacks and ordered the immediate pub-
lic release of the final document despite the fact that all other legal filings
had been kept sealed for months by military commissions.0°
The second order, entitled "Review of Detention Policy Options,"
created an inter-agency task force to:
Conduct a comprehensive review [within 180 days] of the lawful options
available to the Federal Government with respect to the apprehension, de-
tention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured
or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism
operations, and to identify such options as are consistent with the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests
ofjustice. 20 1
The third executive order, entitled "Ensuring Lawful Interrogations," con-
tained firm language and commitments.2 2 Section 1 revoked Executive
Order 13,440 of July 20, 2007: "All executive directives, orders, and regula-
tions inconsistent with this order, including but not limited to those issued
by the Central Intelligence Agency... from September 11, 2001, to January
20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals,
are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order.
' 203
It should be recalled that former president Bush had signed this or-
der entitled "Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3
as Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the
Central Intelligence Agency. '' 204 It is my firm opinion that this order suf-
fered from the same deficiencies as previous military orders promulgated by
President Bush in his function as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
by the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. The Order also contravened the
object and purpose of Common Article 3,205 as section 3 of the Order stated,
inter alia:
200 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Guantnamo Judge Proceeds With
Military Commissions in Defiance of Obama Order (Mar. 10, 2009), available at
http://aclu.org/safefree/detention/38969prs20090310.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
201 Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://edocket.
access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1895.pdf
202 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://edocket.
access.gpo.gov/2009/pd(E9-1885.pdf.
203 Id.
204 Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007), available at http://
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-3656.pdf.
205 Id.
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I hereby determine that Common Article 3 shall apply to a program of de-
tention and interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency...
The requirements . . . shall be applied with respect to detainees in such
program without adverse distinction as to their race, color, religion or
faith, sex, birth, or wealth.206
Moreover, Bush determined unilaterally, without any judicial oversight,
that:
A program of detention and interrogation approved by the director of the
[CIA] fully complies with the obligations of the United States under
Common Article 3, provided that:
(i) the conditions of confnement and interrogation practices of the
program do not include:
(A) torture ... ;
(B) any acts prohibited by section 2441(d) of title 18, United
States Code... ;
(D) other acts of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment ...
[and]
(E) willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse. 207
This executive order called for an immediate intensive correspon-
dence between Oregon Senator Ron Wyden, Office of Legal Counsel, and
the Department of Justice (DOJ). During this correspondence, the question
of whether Common Article 3 requires that detainees be treated humanely in
all circumstances led Senator Wyden to question whether or not the DOJ
208believed that the meaning of this Article can vary. In particular, he ques-
tioned whether there are any possible instances in which the identity of a
detainee, or the information that the detainee is assessed to possess, could
help determine what kind of treatment could be considered humane in a
particular case.20 9
Moreover, a shocking eighty-one page memorandum prepared by
John Yoo, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, dated March 14,
2003-but only declassified on March 31, 2008-and the release of an al-
most four-hundred page report by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
the Inspector General containing a detailed review of the FBI's Involvement
206 Id. § 3.
207 Id. § 3(b).
208 See Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, to Steven Bradbury, Acting Assistant Att'y
Gen. for the Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice (Aug. 8, 2007), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/washington/20080427-INTEL/letterl .pdf (asking
for clarification on the meanings of the phrases "inhumane treatment" and "cruel, inhumane
and degrading treatment.").
209 Id.
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in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantdnamo Bay, Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, have not done much to alleviate the world's concern
with the unilateral interpretation of the U.S.' obligations regarding the law
of war and international human rights by the Bush administration.21 °
Section 3 of the President Obama's executive order stated that all
interrogations techniques and interrogations-related treatment should be in
conformity with the list of interrogations techniques contained in Army
Field Manual 222.3.211 It is probably for that reason that outside pressure on
governmental departments increased over the last two months to release and
declassify memoranda and opinions of the Bush presidency.212 At the in-
struction of President Obama, a Pentagon report was compiled in February
2009 on the compatibility of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
with the conditions of confinement at Guantdtnamo.213 The report examined
twenty-seven aspects of detention operations-including solitary confine-
ment, forced-feeding of hunger strikers, the use of force by guards-and
concluded that the Guantdnamo operations were in compliance with the
standards of Article 3.214 However, what the report did not discuss was
whether the operations at Guantdinamo were in conformity with all applica-
ble laws governing conditions of confinement, as the President had men-
tioned in section 6 of Executive Order 13,491.215 It leaves open the larger
question suggested in the President's order: what other laws apply to
Guantdinamo detainees? In my opinion, it would imply relevant customary
international law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and any federal rules with regard to custody.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR
While international humanitarian law is specifically designed to
regulate the conduct of hostilities between state and non-state actors, inter-
210 Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter May 2008 Report]. The report was declassified only in May 2008.
211 Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 202, § 3(b).
212 See Posting of Dan Nguyen and Christopher Weaver to ProPublica, http://www.
propublica.org/special/missing-memos (Apr. 16, 2009); Press Release, Dep't of Justice,
Department of Justice Releases Nine Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda and Opinions
(Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-181.html; Mi-
chael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Coming Soon: Declassified Bush Era Torture Memos,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 30, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/190362.
213 The Office of the Sec'y of Defense and Joint Staff, Review of Department Compliance
with President's Executive Order on Detainee Conditions (2009), http://www.dod.mil/
pubs/foi/detainees/index.html.
214 Id.
215 See Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 202, § 6.
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national human rights law imposes obligations on states to ensure the pro-
tection of human rights and civil liberties at all times. They complement
each other and operate simultaneously in situations of armed conflict. The
difference between the two categories of law is that international humanitar-
ian law protects primarily persons associated with one party to the conflict
who find themselves in the hands of the enemy, whereas the nationality of
the individual or its affiliation to a party to the conflict is generally not rele-
vant for the application of human rights law.
In addition, as Professor Jochen Frowein rightly pointed out,
"[i]ntemational humanitarian law takes precedence over human rights trea-
ties as lex specialis in so far as it may constitute a special justification in
armed conflict for interference with rights protected under human rights
treaties. ' ' 216 It is a well-established rule that during conflict, the unlawful
killing of a combatant does not violate the right to life, although the right to
life is considered a non-derogable right.
The ICJ adopted a similar reasoning in its Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons where it declared: "It was
suggested that the Covenant was directed at the protection of human rights
in peacetime, but the questions relating to unlawful loss of life in hostilities
were governed by law applicable in armed conflict., 217 The court observed:
The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of
national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a
provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of
life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate
the conduct of hostilities.218
It is necessary at this stage to refer to some General Comments
(GC) adopted by the Human Rights Committee. GC No. 29 on Article 4
contains one of the most important reflections by the Committee on issues
which reach out to the very heart of individual protection of human rights.
216 Jochen Frowein, The Relationship Between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of
Belligerent Occupation, 28 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 1, 16 (1998).
217 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
239 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf.
218 Id. at 240. See also Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the
World Court: A Historic Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1997); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9), avaliable at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. The
following articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are relevant for
our analysis: Articles 4, 6, 9, 10 and 14.
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As Professor Fitzpatrick correctly pointed out, this comment "reflects many
years of derogation jurisprudence by human rights treaty bodies., 2 1 9
In paragraph 15, the Committee states, "[i]t is inherent in the pro-
tection of rights explicitly recognized as non-derogable in Article 4, para-
graph 2, that they must be secured by procedural guarantees, including, of-
ten, judicial guarantees. 220 In addition, in paragraph 16, the Committee
held that:
As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed un-
der international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee
finds no justification for derogation from these guarantees during other
emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion that the principles
of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair
trial must be respected during a state of emergency. Only a court of law
may try and convict a person for a criminal offence. The presumption of
innocence must be respected. 221
With respect to the length of detention pending trial, in GC No. 8 on
Article 9 the Committee stated, "[p]re-trial detention should be an exception
and as short as possible., 222 It considered that the trial should take place
within a reasonable time or else the person should be released.223 In cases of
so-called preventive detention, used for reasons of public security, these
detentions may not be arbitrary but must be controlled by the same provi-
sions and based on grounds and procedures established by law.224 Addition-
ally, the reasons for the detention should be given and control to be exer-
cised by a court established by law. 225
Regarding the requirement of humane treatment of prisoners, the
Committee stated in GC No. 21, "[u]ltimate responsibility for the obser-
vance of this principle rests with the state as regards all institutions where
persons are lawfully held against their will, not only in prisons but also, for
219 Fitzpatrick, supra note 93, at 351; U.N. Human Rights Committee [UNHCR], General
Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations During a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/453883fdlf.html. See also The Secretary-General, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), at 234 (May 27, 2008), available at http://www.unhchr.
ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/cal2c3a4ea8d6c53cl256d5OOO56e56fOpendocument [hereinafter Compi-
lation of Human Rights Treaty Bodies General Comments].
220 UNHCR, General Comment No. 29, supra note 219, 15.
221 Id. 16.
222 Compilation of Human Rights Treaty Bodies General Comments, supra note 219, at
234.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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example, hospitals, detention camps or correctional institutions. 226 GC No.
32 on Art. 14, which replaced GC No. 13 in July 2007, is considered a yard-
stick for procedural guarantees within the administration of justice. It states,
"Article 14 encompasses the right of access to the courts in cases of deter-
mination of criminal charges and rights and obligations in a suit at law.,
2 2 7
Article 14 provides that:
Access to administration of justice must effectively be guaranteed in all
such cases to ensure that no individual is deprived, in procedural terms, of
his/her right to claim justice. The right of access to courts and tribunals
and equality before them is not limited to citizens of States parties, but
must also be available to all individuals, regardless nationality or stateless-
ness, or whatever their status .... A situation in which an individual's at-
tempts to access the competent courts or tribunals are systematically frus-
trated de jure or de facto runs counter to the guarantee of Article 14,
paragraph 1. 228
Furthermore, the notion of a tribunal designated as a body, regard-
less of its denomination, established by law, is independent of the executive
and legislative branches of government or enjoys in specific cases judicial
independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in
nature. 229 The requirement of competence, independence, and impartiality
of a tribunal in the sense of Article 14, therefore, is an absolute right that is
not subject to any exception.230 Additionally, "[t]he provisions of article 14
apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that Article whether
ordinary or specialized.,
231
The Committee also noted that the trial of civilians by military spe-
cial courts may raise serious problems as far as impartial and independent
administration of justice is concerned.232 The Committee expressed its con-
cern about the establishment of special tribunals where irregularities could
take place such as exclusion of the public or even the accused or representa-
tives from the proceedings, restrictions of the right to a lawyer of their own
choice, severe restrictions or denial of the right to communicate with law-
yers, particularly when held incommunicado, and severe restrictions on the
226 Id. at 180, 1.
227 Id. at 249, 8.
228 Id. at 249, 9.
229 Id. at 249-50.
230 Id. at 122, 1.
231 Id. at 123, 4
232 Id. at 249.
[Vol. 42:21
2009] CONSEQUENCES OF UNLAWFUL PREEMPTION 59
right to cross-examine witnesses. 233 The notion of fair trial includes the
guarantee of a fair and public hearing, which should be expeditious.234
It is imperative at this stage to analyze the international obligations
of the U.S. under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). 235 After a protracted period of time, the U.S. finally ratified the
ICCPR on June 8, 1992 and it entered into force on September 8, 1992.236
The government immediately attached a number of reservations, under-
standings and declarations to its ratification.237
U.S. instruments of ratification for certain human rights treaties
have an understanding that contains a federal clause. These clauses do not
make human rights treaties inapplicable as federal law, but rather they allow
for state participation, while assuring concurrent duties through federal and
state legal processes and creating an overall responsibility for treaty-
implementation in the federal government. In addition, states should ensure
that as a minimum threshold states cannot deny human rights protection
based on treaties.238
Arguments in favor of this legal position that a federal clause does
not make human rights treaties inapplicable can be found in the Restatement
(Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, which reads:
[C]ustomary law that has developed since the United States became a state
is incorporated into United States law as of the time it matures into
international law .... The Constitution declares treaties of the United
States... to be "the supreme Law of the Land" (Article VI), and provides
that cases arising under treaties are within the Judicial Power of the United
States .... [Q]uestions of international law could be determined differ-
ently by the courts of various States and by the federal courts .... From
the beginning, the interpretation or application of United States treaties by
233 Id. 6-12.
234 Id. at 248.
235 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
236 See INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 261
(Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum eds., 1995); 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 1992).
237 See INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 236; U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 24, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 645-49 (1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR REPORT].
238 See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Preemptive and Interpretative Force of International Human
Rights Law in State Courts, 90 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 262, 264 (1996). See also Jordan J.
Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United
States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999) (providing a convincing analysis of the supposition
that customary international law and human rights treaties form part of the U.S. legal
system).
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State courts was subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 239
The Paquete Habana case has been interpreted to allow customary
international law to prevail over executive acts. 240 A better argument in fa-
vor of the applicability of international customary law in the American legal
system is the 1980 ruling in the case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, where the 2nd
Circuit cited the ICCPR-although the U.S. was not yet a party-in favor of
the argument that torture was in violation of the Law of Nations within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C 1350.241
Professor Jordan Paust stated that the instrument of ratification for
certain human rights treaties contain a declaration that many of the articles
are "non-self-executing"; such declarations function as reservations that are
fundamentally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaties and,
under international law, and are thus void ab initio.242 This position is defi-
nitely influenced by GC No. 24, adopted by the Human Rights Committee
in 1994.243 In a profound interpretation of reservations, the Committee
stated:
The absence of a prohibition on reservations does not mean that any reser-
vation is permitted. The matter of reservations under the Covenant and the
first Optional Protocol is governed by international law. Article 19 (3) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides relevant guidance.
It stipulates that where a reservation is not prohibited by the treaty or falls
within the specified permitted categories, a State may make a reservation
provided it is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.244
239 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND AGREEMENTS AS UNITED STATES LAW 41 (1987).
240 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). This, however, seems to be a "hineinin-
terpretierung" from the ruling of Justice Gray. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 146, 149, 163-64 (1996).
241 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980). I beg to disagree with
Professor Paust, who is of the opinion that the Sabbatino case is also a strong argument in
favor of the validity of customary international law. See Paust, supra note 238, at 318 (citing
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). See also J.P. Fonteyne, Sabba-
tino Case, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (2000) (confirming the
U.S. Supreme Court's continued adherence to traditional policy of judicial restraint and
deference to the executive branch of government in matters concerning foreign relations).
242 Paust, supra note 238, at 322-23. See also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); John Quigly, Human Rights Defences in US Courts, 20 HuM.
RTS. Q. 555, 558 (1998).
243 Compilation of Human Rights Treaty Bodies General Comments, supra note 219, at
210-16.
244 Id
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In a very detailed historical analysis of the notion of non-self-
execution within the American legal and political setting, Professor David
Sloss noted that subsequent administrations had different views on the issue
without knowing the real meaning of the term non-self-execution.245 Even
learned scholars had difficulty coming to grips with the term. For example,
the late Professor Myres S. McDougal stated in 1951, "[t]his word 'self-
executing' is essentially meaningless, and the quicker we drop it from our
vocabulary the better for clarity and understanding.
246
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Medellin v. Texas at-
tempted to answer some of the questions surrounding the doctrine of self-
execution.247 The Court concluded, inter alia, that the intent of the U.S.
treaty makers should be determinative of self-execution.248 The Court, how-
ever, implicitly rejected the argument in the Restatement (Third) of U.S.
Foreign Relations Law that there should be a strong presumption in favor of
treaty self-execution. 49 Professor Curtis Bradley concludes that the judg-
ment should best be read as requiring self-execution to be resolved on a
treaty-by-treaty basis. 250 He also concludes that it is not the extent to which
treaties will be determined to be non-self-executing, but the consequences
of that determination.251 When the former first Bush Administration sent the
text of the ICCPR to the Senate, the bottom line became clear. It was ex-
plained that "the intent is to clarify that the [ICCPR] will not create a pri-
vate course of action in U.S. courts. 252
Indeed, when litigants raise well-founded human rights claims, U.S.
courts are presented with a dilemma. As Professor David Sloss cogently
pointed out:
245 See generally David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999).
246 Legal Effect of Treaties in Municipal Law: Discussion, 45 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
100, 101-02 (1951).
247 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
248 Id. at 1392.
249 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND AGREEMENTS AS UNITED STATES LAW 46-47 (1987). See also Medellin, 128 S. Ct.
at 1357.
250 Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Medellin: Intent, Presumptions and Non-Self-Executing
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 551 (2008).
251 Id. at 541; Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1362-69.
252 ICCPR REPORT, supra note 237, at 657. See also Malvina Halberstam, The United
States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 64, 67-69 (1997) (stating that decla-
rations of non-self-execution are inconsistent with the language, history, and purpose of
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution and constitutionally suspect); Ryan Goodman, Human
Rights Treaties? Invalid Reservations and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT.'L L. 531, 545-46
(2002).
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If courts refuse to reach the merits of such claims, they risks contravening
the manifest intent of the treaty makers to comply with treaty obligations,
in particular, the obligation to ensure that persons who raise such claims
receive an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal. On the other
hand, if courts do reach the merits of such claims, they risk domestication
of human rights treaties, which would be contrary to the assurances that
the Executive Branch provided the Senate. 253
This dilemma, which might willy-nilly have been artificially
created, could be overcome if one goes back to the statement Chief Justice
Marshall two centuries ago, namely "it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."1254
In a very important development for the adjudication of legal claims
arising from alleged human rights violations committed against alleged 9/11
conspirators, the delegation, presenting the first U.S. report in 1995 under
Article 40 of the ICCPR, informed the Human Rights Committee that the
non-self-executing declaration attached to the ICCPR did not preclude its
indirect judicial application.25 5
It should be clear from the above analysis that suspects held in de-
tention camps in Guantdnamo or those held in U.S. prisons are not without
legal protection, and that courts have an obligation to decide on the merits
of any case brought before them. It is inconceivable that a democracy can
be legitimized without providing the full gamut of human rights protection.
As the European Court of Human Rights already stated in 1975:
[O]ne can scarcely concede of the rule of law without there being a possi-
bility of having access to the courts ... the principle whereby a civil claim
must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the univer-
sally "recognized" fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the
principle of international law which forbids the denial ofjustice. 256
253 Sloss, supra note 245, at 197.
254 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
255 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Com-
mittee: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Oct. 3, 1995). See also
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee,
United States of America, 276, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995) ("Notwithstanding the
non-self-executing declaration of the United States, American courts are not prevented from
seeking guidance from the Covenant in interpreting American law.").
256 Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A), at 12-14 (1975).
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V. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES
In 2006, the U.S. appeared twice before human rights bodies: the
Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee.
A. The Committee Against Torture
During the discussion in May 2006, the country Rapporteur noted
that a U.S. report257 was submitted against the background of the challenges
posed by international terrorism, which constituted one of the greatest viola-
tion of human rights of all times.258 He observed that visits by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross and journalists had found no evidence of
torture as distinct from ill-treatment. 259 However, given that the Special
Rapporteur on Torture had not been able to interview detainees there, and
since the U.S. had included a reservation in its instrument of ratification
concerning the use of coercive techniques authorized by federal law juri-
sprudence, he requested assurances that the interrogation techniques em-
ployed at Guantdinamo would not infringe or defeat the purposes of the
260Convention. One of the major legal issues in the dialogue between the
U.S. government and human rights treaty bodies is the principle of territori-
ality. The U.S. government considers that Guantdnamo is outside the juris-
diction of the U.S., while the treaty bodies consider it to be within its juris-
diction.2
61
In its concluding observations, adopted on May 19, 2006, the
Committee Against Torture expressed serious concerns and submitted a
number of recommendations for the government to act upon. 262 The Com-
257 See generally U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, annex 1, U.N. Doc. CATIC/48/
Add.3/Rev. 1 (Jan. 13, 2006) (contains a large annex devoted to the consequences of 9/11).
258 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Summary Record of the 703rd Meeting, 77, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/SR.703 (May 12, 2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
9d89ef092b9f52b8c 125718000353270/$FILE/G0641846.pdf.
259 Id. 84.
260 Id. See also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Human Rights, Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights Civil and Political Rights: Situation of Detainees at Guantinamo Bay,
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006) (presented on Feb. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/documents/844/815/document/en/pdf/text.pdf
[hereinafter Situation of Detainees at Guantnamo Bay].
261 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention, 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000), available at
http://www.bayefsky.com/reports/usa cat c 28 add.5_1999.pdf. See also U.N. Comm.
Against Torture, List of lssues to be Considered During the Examination of the Second Peri-
odic Report of the United States of America (CAT/C/48/Add.3), 44, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/Q/2 (Feb. 8, 2006).
262 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006),
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mittee strongly urged the state party to adopt clearer legal provisions to im-
plement the principle of absolute prohibition of torture in its domestic law
without any possible derogation.263 The Committee regretted the state par-
ty's opinion that the Convention is not applicable in times and in the context
of armed conflict, on the basis of the argument that the law of armed con-
flict is the exclusive lex specialis applicable. 264 The Committee recom-
mended that the government "recognize and ensure that the Convention
applies at all times, whether in peace, war, or armed conflict, in territory
under its jurisdiction. 265
The Committee expressed its concern "that detaining persons in-
definitely without charges constitutes per se a violation of the Conven-
tion. ' 266 It added that detainees are held for a protracted period of time "at
Guantdnamo, without sufficient legal safeguards and without traditional
assessment of the justification for their detention" as is required by Articles
2, 3, and 16 of the Convention.267 It recommend that the U.S. "should cease
to detain any person in Guantdnamo and close the detention facility, permit
access by the detainees to judicial process or release them as soon as possi-
ble., 268 Additionally, the U.S. should ensure "that they [the detainees]
are not returned to any State where they could face a real risk of being
tortured.
269
The Committee noted with concern "that the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA) aims to withdraw jurisdiction of the state party's federal
courts with respect to habeas corpus petitions, or other claims by or on be-
half of Guantdnamo Bay detainees." 270 It also expressed its concern about
the independence of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and the
Administrative Review Boards.27'
The U.S. government subsequently provided comments on the con-
clusions and recommendations of the Committee.272 The government
reacted strongly to the Committee's recommendation to "cease to detain any
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043cl 256a450044f33 1/
e2d4f5b2dcccOa4cc 12571eeOO290ce/$FILE/G0643225.pdf [hereinafter Article 19].
263 Id. 13.
264 Id. 14.
265 id.
266 Id. 22.
267 id.
268 Id.
269 id.
270 Id. 27.
271 d. T 30.
272 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/U.S.A/CO/2/Add. 1 (Nov. 6, 2007).
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99273 ccperson at Guantinamo Bay, permitting judicial access by enemy com-
batants in that facility," and not returning individuals to countries where
they "face a real risk of being tortured., 274 The U.S. went on to explain that
The United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
their supporters. As part of this conflict, the United States captures and de-
tains enemy combatants, and is entitled under the law of war or to hold
them until the end of hostilities. The law of war, and not the Convention,
provides the applicable legal framework governing these detentions. 275
The U.S. further stated that:
The United States does permit access by Guantanamo detainees to judicial
process. Every detainee in Guantanamo is evaluated by a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), which determines whether the detainee
was properly classified as an enemy combatant and includes a number of
procedural guarantees. A CSRT decision can be directly appealed to a
United States domestic civilian court, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. Providing such an opportunity for judicial review ex-
ceeds the requirements of the law of war and is an unprecedented and ex-
panded protection available to all detainees at Guantanamo. These proce-
dural protections are more extensive than those applied by any other nation
in any previous armed conflict to determine a combatant's status. 276
It should be clear, as demonstrated above, that all procedures estab-
lished by the Bush administration since November 2001, including appeal
procedures, do not attest to the necessary impartiality and independence
required by the law of war, but instead accompany many procedural and
substantial violations of human rights.
B. The Human Rights Committee
During its summer session in July 2006, the Human Rights Com-
mittee combined the second and third periodic reports of the U.S. 2 7 7 The
representative of the U.S. informed the Committee that the U.S. "did not
consider questions concerning the war on terrorism, and detention and inter-
273 Id. 10.
274 Id.
275 Id. 1 i.
276 Id. 13.
277 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005); U.N. Human
Rights Comm., List of Issues to be Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the
Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/Q/3 (Apr. 26, 2006); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
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rogation outside United States territory to fall within the scope of the Cove-
nant., 278 The representative "agreed that measures taken to combat terror-
ism should not compromise human rights principles, '2 79 but he repeated the
position taken before the Committee Against Torture that the Covenant only
applies "to treatment of prisoners in domestic United States prisons," and
that "the law of armed conflict governs United States detention operations
in Guantdnamo Bay" and other places.28 0 The representative continued to
reject the Committee's position that the scope of Article 2(1) of the Cove-
nant covered the situation in Guantdnamo. 281 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Boumediene case clearly stated, "[n]o Cuban court has jurisdic-
tion to hear these petitioners' claims, and no law other than the laws of
United States applies to the naval station. 2 82 Nevertheless, in a gnat strain-
ing analysis, the representative of the U.S. maintained that "his delegation
found it difficult to accept that the conjunction in the phrase 'within its terri-
tory and is subject to its jurisdiction' could be interpreted as meaning
'and/or'. 283 It "was particularly implausible given that the Covenant nego-
tiators had rejected the proposal to substitute the word 'or' for 'and'. 284 In
his opinion, "parties to a treaty were generally empowered to give a binding
interpretation of its provisions unless the treaty provided otherwise. 285
However, this "was not the case in the Covenant, nor did it authorize the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue legally binding interpretations
of its provisions. 286
One of the members of the Committee, Sir Nigel Rodley, in a me-
ticulous analysis explained the reasons for the Committee's position. He
maintained that the Committee's interpretation of article 2 "coincided with
that of the ICJ, namely that States parties were required to ensure rights for
all individuals within it their territory and to all individuals subject to their
jurisdiction., 287 He stated that:
The primary rule of interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties was contained in article 31, which stated that a treaty was
to be interpreted in good faith "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its ob-
278 U.N. Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., 2380th mtg., 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2380
(July 27, 2006) [hereinafter Summary Record of the 2 3 80th Meeting].
279 Id.
280 Id. 3.
281 id. 8.
282 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2251 (2008).
283 Summary Record of the 2380th Meeting, supra note 278, 8.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. 65.
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ject and purpose." The ordinary meaning of article 2 was the one given to
it by the Committee, and the context included any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which established the agreement of the States
parties regarding its interpretation. 288
He continued stating that:
It did not include the travaux pr~paratoires, which were supplementary
means of interpretation under article 32 of the Vienna Convention. The ob-
ject and purpose were laid down clearly in the preamble to the Covenant
and consisted in protecting persons from the overreaching power of States.
If the travaux pr~paratoires were to be consulted at all, the main reasons
for nervousness at the time of drafting the Covenant about the principle of
extraterritoriality were that it was difficult to apply the Covenant in an-
other person's country, an issue that did not, however, arise since the per-
sons concerned must be under the State party's control, and to avoid cer-
tain situations involving occupation. 289
He expressed the hope that the U.S. government would "revisit the
question of whether the extraterritorial application was so manifestly ex-
cluded. , 2
90
Guidance on the issue of extra-territoriality issue could be found in
General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations Im-
posed on States Parties to the Covenant.291 The Committee observed that
"while article 2 is couched in terms of obligations of State Parties towards
individuals as the right-holders under the Covenant, every State Party has a
legal interest in the performance by every other State Party of its obliga-
tions., 292 "This follows from the fact that the 'rules concerning the basic
rights of the human person' are erga omnes obligations .... ,,293 "The obli-
gations of the Covenant in general and article 2 in particular are binding on
every state party as a whole. 294 In addition, "the beneficiaries of the rights
recognized by the Covenant are individuals," 295 and "states parties are re-
quired by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights
to all persons who may be within their territory and all persons subject to
their jurisdiction., 296 "This means that a State party must respect and ensure
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 id.
291 U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May 26, 2004),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/478b26ae2.pdf.
292 Id. 2.
293 id.
294 Id. 4.
295 id. 9.
296 Id. 10.
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the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the
State Party.
297
In the list of issues, a number of pertinent questions were put to the
state party. Regarding counter-terrorism measures and the respect for Cove-
nant rights, the Committee requested to "comment on the compatibility with
the Covenant of the definition of terrorism under national law and of the
Congress' Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution
(AUMF), which provides the President with all powers 'necessary and ap-
,,298propriate to protect American citizens from terrorist acts. It also re-
quested "updated information on the identity, place of origin, place of dep-
rivation of liberty and number of persons held at GuantAnamo," and the
interrogations techniques authorized and practised there. 299 Additionally, it
requested information "on the significance of Section 1005 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005" for the detainees and "what guarantees ensure the
independence of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and the
Administrative Review Boards (ARBs). 300
In its concluding observations, the Committee expressed its concern
about the potentially overbroad reach of the definition of terrorism under
domestic law and recommended that:
The State party should ensure that its counter-terrorism measures are in
full conformity with the Covenant and in particular that the legislation
adopted in this context is limited to crimes that would justify being assimi-
lated to terrorism, and the grave consequences associated with it.30
"The Committee noted with concern that Section 1005(e) of the De-
tainee Treatment Act bars detainees at Guantinamo from seeking review in
cases of allegations of ill-treatment or poor conditions of detention," re-
views permitted under articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant.3 °2 It recommended
that the government should amend Section 1005 so as to allow detainees in
297 Id.
298 U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues to be Taken Up in Connection with the Con-
sideration of the Second and Third Periodic Reports of the U.S., 1 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/Q/3 (Apr. 26, 2006), available at http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx?country=us.
299 Id. 5.
300 Id.
301 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://tb.ohchr.
org/default.aspx?country--us.
302 Id. 15.
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Guantdnamo to seek a review of their treatment or conditions of detention
before a court.303 The Committee also expressed concern that:
[Flollowing the Supreme Court ruling in Rasul v. Bush (2004), proceed-
ings before Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and Administra-
tive Review Boards (ARBs), mandated respectively to determine and re-
view the status of detainees, may not offer adequate safeguards of due
process, in particular due to: (a) their lack of independence from the ex-
ecutive branch and the army, (b) restrictions on the rights of detainees to
have access to all proceedings and evidence, (c) the inevitable difficulty
CSRTs and ARBs face in summoning witnesses, and (d) the possibility
given to CSRTs and ARBs, under Section 1005 of the 2005 Detainee
Treatment Act, to weigh evidence obtained by coercion for its probative
value. 304
The Committee recommended that the state parties should ensure,
in accordance with Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, that persons detained in
Guantdnamo "are entitled to proceedings before a court to decide, without
delay, on the lawfulness of their detention or order their release. Due proc-
ess, independence of the reviewing courts from the executive branch and the
army, access of detainees to counsel of their choice and to all proceedings
and evidence, should be guaranteed in this regard. 30 5
VI. ILLEGAL PRACTICES AMOUNTING TO TORTURE
I would like to comment on two phenomena practiced by the
American administration in the war against terrorism, namely extraordinary
rendition and water boarding. These phenomena present a whole gamut of
violations of human rights under many human rights instruments but in par-
ticular under the Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR.
A. Extraordinary Renditions
The term "extraordinary rendition" is used, in conjunction with ir-
regular rendition, to describe the apprehension and extrajudicial transfer of a
person from one state to another.306 The term "torture by proxy" is also used
by some critics to describe situations in which the U.S. has reportedly trans-
303 Id.
'04 Id. 18.
305 Id.
306 MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, RENDITIONS: CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS ON TORTURE 2
(CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf.
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ferred suspected terrorists to countries known to employ harsher interroga-
tion techniques that may rise to the level of torture.3 °7
The U.S. extraordinary rendition program has raised a series of
moral, judicial, and political allegations, prompting several official Euro-
pean Union investigations. A June 2006 report from the Council of Europe
estimated that thirty to fifty people had been kidnapped by the CIA on EU
territory and subsequently rendered to other countries, often after having
transited through secret detention centers, so-called black sites, used by the
CIA in cooperation with other governments.30 8 According to a European
Parliament report of February 2007, the CIA had conducted 1,245 flights
into European airspace, many of them to destinations where suspects could
face torture in violation of international human rights law. 30 9 A large major-
ity of the European Union Parliament endorsed the report's conclusion that
many member states tolerated extraordinary rendition and criticized several
European governments and intelligence agencies for their unwillingness to
co-operate with the investigation.310
The CIA was granted permission to use rendition in a Presidential
directive signed by President Clinton in 1995.311 However, the frequency of
extraordinary rendition has grown sharply since the 9/11 attacks. Modem
307 Comm. on Int'l Human Rights of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. & Ctr. for
Human Rights and Global Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Torture by Proxy: International
and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions", at 23 (2004), available at
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Torture%20by%2OProxy%20-%2OFinal%20(PDF).pdf.
308 Dick Marty, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers Involving
Council of Europe Member States, Parliamentary Assembly, Comm. on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, AS/Jur (2006), 13 (Jun. 7, 2006), available at http://assembly.
coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060606_Ejdoc162006PartlI-FINAL.pdf (calling inter alia
for the closure of Guantdnamo and for European countries to immediately seek the return of
their citizens and residents who are being held illegally by the U.S. authorities).
309 Press Release, EU Justice and Home Affairs, CIA Activities in Europe: European
Parliament Adopts Final Report Deploring Passivity From Some Member States (Feb. 14,
2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&
reference=20070209IPR02947&language=EN.
310 See Dick Marty, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council
of Europe Member States: Second Report, Parliamentary Assembly, Comm. on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Doc. 11302 rev. (Jun. 11, 2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int/
Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc 11302.pdf.
311 PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 39 U.S. POLICY ON COUNTERTERRORSM (Jun. 21,
1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. See R. Bonner, The CIA's
Secret Torture, N. Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2007 (a recent article on the illegal practice of
extra ordinary rendition). See also Leila Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other
Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007); CIA,
ExTRAoRDINARY RENDITIONS, FLIGHTS, TORTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY-A EUROPEAN
APPROACH (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Jan. 2009); Margaret
Satterthwaite, The US. Program of Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Detention Past and
Future, in id at 18-27.
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forms of rendition include taking suspects into U.S. custody but delivered to
a third-party state, often without ever being on U.S. soil and without involv-
ing the rendering country's judiciary. Such detainees, subjected to those
practices, are called "ghost detainees."
The prohibition against torture is not only a principle of treaty law,
but it has generally been considered to be a peremptory norm of customary
international law from which no derogation is permitted.312 The U.S. gov-
ernment commented on the recommendations by the Committee Against
Torture, which had expressed its concern about extraordinary rendition and
the principle of non-refoulement. In paragraph twenty of its recommenda-
tions, the Committee stated:
The State party should apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all detain-
ees in its custody, cease the rendition of suspects, in particular by its intel-
ligence agencies, to States where they face a real risk of torture, in order to
comply with its obligations under article 3 of the Convention. The State
party should always ensure that suspects have the possibility to challenge
decisions of refoulement. 313
The state party replied that these conclusions and recommendations
raised two issues:
The first issue is the evidentiary standard that would trigger application of
CAT Article 3. As the United States described to the Committee, pursuant
to a formal understanding the United States filed at the time it became a
State Party to the Convention, the United States determines whether it is
more likely than not that a person would be tortured, rather than whether a
person faces a "real risk" of torture. 314
However, in my opinion, because the "more likely than not" stan-
dard is framed as an "understanding" as opposed to a "reservation" because
presumably it was not intended to actually modify U.S. obligations under
the treaty.
312 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Prosecutor v.
Furund~ija, IT-95-17/1-TA, Judgment, Judicial Supplement 18 (July 21, 2000), available at
http://www.krim.unibe.ch/unibe/rechtswissenschaft/isk/content/e663/e2678/e2731/e2880/file
s2886/FurundzijaFalllCTYger.pdf; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987); PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
(2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/univejur.pdf; Leila Nadya Sadat,
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law, 37 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 309 (2006).
313 Article 19, supra note 262, 20.
314 See United States Response to Specific Recommendations Identified by the Committee
Against Torture, 2, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100843.pdf
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter U.S. Response]; U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Under-
standings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. 36, 198 (1990).
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The state party went on to declare that:
The second issue addresses the territorial scope of Article 3. Although the
United States and the Committee hold differing views on the applicability
of the non-refoulement obligation in Article 3 of the Convention outside
the territory of a State Party, as the United States explained to the Commit-
tee at length, with respect to persons outside the territory of the United
States as a matter of policy, the United States government does not transfer
persons to countries where it determines that it is more likely than not that
they will be tortured. This policy applies to all components of the govern-
ment, including the intelligence agencies. Although there is no require-
ment under the Convention that individuals should have the possibility to
challenge refoulement, United States practice in the different areas in
which this provision comes into play is designed to ensure that any torture
concerns, whenever raised by the individual to be transferred, are taken
into account. 
3 15
Regarding paragraph 24, the Committee had recommended that:
The State party should rescind any interrogation technique, including
methods involving sexual humiliation, "waterboarding," "short shackling"
and using dogs to induce fear, that constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, in all places of detention under its de
facto effective control, in order to comply with its obligations under the
Convention. 316
The U.S. government replied by informing the Committee that the U.S. is in
an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their supporters. 3 17 The
U.S. government further responded that:
As part of this conflict, the United States captures and detains enemy com-
batants, and is entitled under the law of war to hold them until the end of
hostilities. The law of war, and not the Convention, is the applicable legal
framework governing these detentions. Moreover, as the Committee is
aware, the United States disagrees with the Committee's contention that
"de facto effective control" is equivalent to territory subject to a State par-
ty's jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention.318
Additionally, the U.S. government pointed out that:
In September 2006, the Department of Defense released the updated DoD
detainee program directive 2310.01E, and the Army released its revised
Field Manual on Interrogation. These documents are attached in Annexes
2 and 3, respectively. They provide guidance to military personnel to en-
315 See U.S. Response, supra note 314, at 2-3.
316 Id. at 7.
317 Id.
318 id.
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sure compliance with the law, and require that all personnel subject to the
directive treat all detainees, regardless of their legal status, consistently
with the minimum standards of Common Article 3 until their final release,
transfer out of DoD control, or repatriation. Of course, certain categories
of detainees, such as enemy prisoners of war, enjoy protections under the
law of war in addition to the minimum standards prescribed by Common
Article 3.319
It is necessary to comment on Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
a case which strained the relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. regard-
ing intelligence sharing. The case concerned detainees who were allegedly
tortured during interrogations after being subjected to extraordinary rendi-
tion.32° Plaintiffs, who were foreign nationals, brought suit because of al-
leged damages inflicted upon them in the so-called rendition program oper-
ated under the auspices of the U.S. government. 321 The plaintiffs alleged
that under that program they were unlawfully apprehended, transported,
imprisoned, and interrogated and-in some instances-tortured under the
direction of the U.S. defendant, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.322 The U.S. gov-
ernment intervened to assert the state secret privilege and to move the court
for dismissal of the action or alternatively for a summary judgment.323
The trial court agreed with the defendant and stated that the gov-
ernment had complied with the procedures for invoking the privilege.324
Consequently, the trial court found that the issues involved in that case were
non-justiciable because the very subject matter of the case was a state se-
cret. 325 In particular, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. made political
and legal waves between the U.S. and the U.K. because at the time of the
plaintiff's unlawful rendition he was a legal resident of the U.K.326 He was
319 Id. at 8. But see OMS GUIDELINE ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO
DETAINEE RENDITION, INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION (Dec. 2004), available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/c-i-a-reports-guidelines-for-interrogators#p=2; INDEPENDENT
PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL
TO REviEw DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (also known as the Schlesinger Report);
ANTHONY R. JONES & GEORGE R. FAY, INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU
GHRAIB (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf
(concentrating entirely on operations in Iraq); May 2008 Report, supra note 210.
320 No. 08-15693, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19647 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2009).
321 Id. at 3-4.
322 Id. at 4-5.
323 Id. at 10.
324 See id. at 10-11.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 5.
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arrested in Karachi in April 2002 and was turned over to the CIA.3 27 After
several months of interrogation, CIA agents blindfolded him, strapped him
328to the seat of a plane, and flew him to Morocco. He was subsequently
secretly detained, interrogated, and tortured by agents of the Moroccan in-
telligence services. 32 9 In January 2004, agents flew him to the secret U.S.
detention facility known as "dark prison" in Kabul, Afghanistan.330 He was
again tortured, and in September 2004 he was transferred to Guantdnamo
Bay.
331
Lawyers for the detainees appealed arguing, inter alia, that the very
subject matter of this suit was not a state secret. 332 On February 9, 2009, a
hearing took place in which the lawyer for the Department of Justice stated
that the current Administration keeps the same position on state secrecy.
333
However, it was the policy to invoke this privilege only when necessary and
in the most appropriate cases consistent with U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.334 The new U.S. Attorney General ordered on the same day a review
of all government claims invoking the state secrets privilege.335
In view of the fact that the plaintiff was a legal resident, the U.K.
Foreign Secretary considered that he had an arguable case that he had been
subjected to torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment by or on
behalf of U.S. authorities during his two-year period of incommunicado
detention. On February 4, 2009, the U.K. High Court of Justice rendered
judgment in Mohamed's case.336 The issue was whether the court should
restore to its first judgment33 7 "paragraphs containing a gist of reports made
by the United States Government to the United Kingdom Government in
relation to the detention and treatment of the claimant ....,,338 The court
327 Id. at 4-5.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 5-6.
330 Id. at 6-7.
331 Id.
332 Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-
15693, 579 F. Supp. 2d 943 (9th Cir. 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
pdfs/safefree/jeppesen-replybrief.pdf.
333 See John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009,
at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/us/lOtorture.html?r-l &partner-
permalink&exprod=permalink (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
334 Id. (quoting Justice Department spokesman Matt Miller).
335 id.
336 Binyarn Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Feb. 4,
2009, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Case No: CO/4241/2008, available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/j udgmentsguidance/mohamed-judgment4-04022009.pdf.
337 Id. 1.
338 id.
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deplored that the U.S. government had refused to allow documents to be
made available for use by Mohamed's lawyers 339 and that the issue was to
balance the "public interest in national security with the public interest in
open justice, the rule of law and democratic accountability. '340 The most
shocking paragraph was that the U.S. attempted to threaten the U.K. if those
redacted paragraphs were made public by re-evaluating its intelligence shar-
ing relationship with the U.K. and possibly reduce the intelligence it pro-
vided. 34' The court concluded that the balance between the interests was
better served by maintaining the paragraphs in its first judgment on the issue
despite concern by the Foreign Secretary.342
The case and the judgment stirred up the media and forced the U.S.
government to release Mohamed, who arrived back in Britain on February
23, 2009. 343 Only one month later it was disclosed that he was offered a plea
bargain requiring him to sign a statement saying he had never been tortured,
promising never to speak to the media, promising never to sue the U.S. or
any U.S. ally (including Britain), and pleading guilty to terror charges.344
Mohamed refused the plea bargain, and, eventually, all charges against him
were dropped.345
B. Waterboarding
Waterboarding is a form of torture that consists of immobilizing a
person on his back with the head angled downwards and pouring water over
the face. Waterboarding carries the risk of extreme pain, injury, and even
death.
Some commentators have argued that waterboarding as an interro-
gation method should not qualify as torture in certain circumstances, while
others such as Professor John Yoo and Attorney General Mukasey have
refused to state whether they would consider waterboarding to be torture
... See id. 6-7.
340 Id. 18.
341 Id. 62. See also Scott Horton, Bush Administration Threatened Britain over Torture
Disclosures, HARPER'S, Feb. 4, 2009, http://harpers.org/2009/02/hbc-90004343 (providing
further discussion on threats by the U.S. to the U.K.) (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
342 Binyam Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Feb. 4,
2009, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, 106-07, Case No: CO/4241/2008,
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/judgments-guidance/mohamed-judgment4-
04022009.pdf.
343 Sam Greenhill, 'Guantanamo Brit' Was Offered Freedom Only if He Promised Not to
Sue the British Government, MAIL ONLINE, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-I 164194/Guantanamo-Brit-offered-freedom-promised-sue-British-Government.
html (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
344 Id.
345 Id.
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without knowing the specific facts of the situation. U.S. legal scholars have
questioned the legality of waterboarding as an interrogation technique.346 At
confirmation hearings for the position of Deputy Attorney General, the At-
torney General commented that the legal question was currently being re-
viewed.
Although historical analysis demonstrates that U.S. courts have
consistently held artificial drowning interrogation to be torture, which, by
its nature violates U.S. statutory law,347 a memorandum prepared by then
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and drafted after top officials
had discussed special methods for captives who refused to co-operate with
U.S. authorities showed that the acceptable methods of interrogation in-
cluded waterboarding, or dropping water into a suspect's face, which can
feel like drowning. 348 It is my firm conviction that the Obama administra-
tion, based on his Executive Order dealing with interrogation practices,
henceforth prohibits this technique.
VII. RETURNING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN APPROPRIATE
REMEDIAL ACTION
The U.N. has faced the problem of terrorism for decades, and thir-
teen international conventions relate to specific terrorist activities. 349 It is,
however, rather recent, although before 9/11, that the General Assembly
adopted a resolution in relation to terrorist prevention and human rights
protection. 35 In addition, members of relevant human rights organizations,
including U.N. Special Rapporteurs and human rights treaty bodies, have
unwaveringly maintained that basic human rights cannot be suspended
while countering terrorism.
351
346 Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts,
45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468 (2007); Wilson R. Huhn, Waterboarding Is Illegal, 86:6
WASH. U. L. REv. (Online Supplement) (2008), available at http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-
opinions/waterboarding-is-illegal/.
347 Wallach, supra note 346.
348 See THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 218 (implicitly authorizing waterboarding by
approving of interrogation methods used on captured al-Qaeda operatives).
349 U.N. Action to Combat Terrorism, available at www.un.org/terrorism.
350 G.A. Res. 48/122, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/122 (Dec. 20, 1993).
31' A detailed list (over twenty pages) is available at the OHCHR homepage. See Office of
the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 32: Human Rights, Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism, Annex I, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Publications
Resources/Pages/FactSheets.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). See generally Situation of
Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, supra note 260; U.N. Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm'n
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New
Priorities, in Particular Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Report of the Sessional Working
Group to Elaborate Detailed Principles and Guidelines with Relevant Commentary, Con-
cerning the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights when Combating Terrorism, U.N.
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The General Assembly has unanimously adopted the Global Strat-
egy to Combat Terrorism, which contains four over-arching provisions, one
of which refers to "[m]easures to ensure respect for human rights for all and
the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. ' 352
The strategy outlines the need to support the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and highlights the role of the Special Rapporteur
on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism
in advising states of their international human rights and other legal obliga-
tions.35 3 Furthermore, it clearly reaffirms that any counter-terrorism meas-
ures taken by states "must comply with our obligations under international
law,... in particular human rights law, refugee law and international hu-
manitarian law., 354 The Security Council has also adopted resolutions to
protect human rights while countering terrorism. 355 The World Summit,
held in September 2005, also recognized that international cooperation to
fight terrorism "must be conducted in conformity with international law,
including the Charter and relevant international conventions and proto-
cols. ' ' 3 5 6 Special Rapporteurs of the then Commission on Human Rights, the
work of which was carried over to the Human Rights Council and the then
Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, have also
been very active on the issue. The fact that the 1993 World Conference On
Human Rights had expressed concern about human rights in the context of
Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/26 (Aug. 25, 2006); Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities,
in Particular Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: An Updated Framework Draft of Principles
and Guidelines Concerning Human Rights and Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/30
(Aug. 3, 2006) (prepared by Kalliopi K. Koufa); U.N. Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm'n
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Paper on International Judicial
Cooperation, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/Corr.1 (Aug. 22, 2006) (prepared by Frangoise
Hampson).
352 The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, Annex (I),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdfOpenElement [hereinafter Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy]. See also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on
Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
U.N. Doc. A/60/825 (Apr. 27, 2006). See also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secre-
tary-General on United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Activities of the United
Nations System in Implementing the Strategy, G.A. Res. 62/272, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/272
(Sept. 15, 2008) (requesting inter alia an updated report on progress made in the implementa-
tion of the Strategy to the 64 h Session of the General Assembly in 2010 and calling upon all
states to make every effort to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism).
353 Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, supra note 352, at Annex Pt. IV, 7, 8.
354 Id. at Annex pmbl., 3.
... See S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); S.C. Res. 1535, U.N.
DOC. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1624, U.N DOC. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14,
2005); S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008).
356 G.A. Res. 60/1, 85, U.N. DOC. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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terrorism 357 gave impetus to other U.N. bodies to deal with human rights
aspects in the fight against terrorism. At its forty-eighth session in 1996, the
Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights entrusted
one of its members, Kalliopi Koufa, with a comprehensive study on human
rights and terrorism.
358
The Special Rapporteur submitted a working paper in 1997, fol-
lowed by five subsequent progress reports and annexes, and a final report in
2004. 359 In these reports she addressed many issues related to terrorism and
human rights such as the legal definition, application of the term to acts
committed in armed conflict and the overlap of international human rights
and humanitarian law, typologies of terrorism whether committed by states
or non-state actors, and activities undertaken by international and regional
bodies.360 The reports do not, however, address counter-terrorism in depth
and do not consider specific national counter-terrorism measures. Neverthe-
less, her last two reports shifted their emphasis of the study in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks. It became clear that fundamental human rights were at stake
in the struggle against terrorism. Consequently, her final report was entitled
Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, In Particular Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism.3 6 1 Her final report set forth policy concerns and articu-
lated the vital importance of the international legal community in encourag-
ing states to diligently work on counter-terrorism, while ensuring that these
matters do not create fear within societies.362 Additionally, the Special Rap-
357 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 30, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23
(July 12, 1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.
157.23.en.
358 Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Res. 1996/20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/
RES/1996/20 (Aug. 29, 1996).
359 See generally U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, Terrorism and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/28 (June 26, 1997), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/
terrorism/rapporteur/index.htm (prepared by Kalliopi K. Koufa) [hereinafter Terrorism and
Human Rights]; U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (June 7, 1999) (prepared by
Kalliopi K. Koufa); U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (June 27, 2001) (prepared by Kalli-
opi K. Koufa); U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/35 (July 17, 2002) (prepared by Kalliopi K.
Koufa); U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP. 1 (Aug. 8, 2003) (prepared by Kalliopi K.
Koufa); U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, In Particular Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 (June 25, 2004) (prepared by Kalliopi
K. Koufa) [hereinafter Specific Human Rights Issues].
360 See Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 359.
361 Specific Human Rights Issues, supra note 359.
362 Id. 71.
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porteur recommended that "mechanism[s] for effective periodic review of
national counter-terrorism measures and practices be adopted and that ways
be developed to ensure modification of those measures and practices that
violate human rights or humanitarian law norms. 363 She also submitted in a
separate document-as a result of seven years of study-a preliminary
framework of draft principles and guidelines concerning human rights and
terrorism. 364 As a result of that report, the Sub-Commission decided to es-
tablish a sessional working group in 2005 with a mandate to "elaborate de-
tailed principles and guidelines, with relevant commentary, concerning the
promotion and protection of human rights when combating terrorism.9
3 65
In the year the Sub-Commission finished its work on the issue, the
Commission took over and appointed for one year an independent expert on
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism. 366 In his report, the expert focused inter alia on the role of civilian
judiciary in supervising national counter-terrorism measures and discussed
the applicability and relevance of international humanitarian law when con-
fronting terrorism in armed conflict, the relationship between international
human rights and international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the
principle of nullem crimen sine lege, the right to due process and to a fair
trial, the establishment of military tribunals, the right to humane treatment,
the principle of non-refoulement, and the transfer of detainees, including
rendition of terrorist suspects.367
In one of his conclusions, the expert, "given the gaps in coverage of
the monitoring systems of the special procedures and treaty bodies and the
pressing need to strengthen human rights protection while countering terror-
363 Id. T 70.
364 See U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, In Particular Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism; A Preliminary Framework Draft of Principles and Guidelines Concern-
ing Human Rights and Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/47 (Aug. 11, 2004), avail-
able at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/index.htm (prepared by
Kalliopi Koufa).
365 See U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues-New Priorities, In Particular Terrorism and
Counter Terrorism: Working Group to Elaborate Detailed Principles and Guidelines, with
Relevant Commentary, Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights When
Combating Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/L.44 (Aug. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/ResolutionSub-Com.pdf.
366 U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Res. 2004/87, 10, 60th Sess., 58th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43f3l391f.html.
367 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Independent
Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, 13-35, 44-55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103 (Feb. 7, 2005).
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ism, ' ' 368 recommended that the "Commission on Human Rights should con-
sider the creation of a special procedure with a multidimensional mandate to
monitor states' counter-terrorism measures and their compatibility with
international human rights law. 369 In view of the fact that the Commission
on Human Rights was replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006, this
procedure was never created. However, the Counter Terrorist Committee
(CTC), established by Security Council resolution 1373, was subsequently
revitalized by Security Council resolution 1535 in which a Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) was established.370
The CTC became operational on July 1, 2005, and includes a human rights
adviser who liaises with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva.
In this context it should be mentioned that the second High Com-
missioner for Human Rights had called for direct contact with the CTC. She
submitted a detailed note to the Chair of the CTC in which she stated that
the "the struggle against terrorism must take place within the framework of
the rule of law, both nationally and internationally; and second, that human
rights must be safeguarded in the struggle against terrorism.
3 71
After the next High Commissioner started to make statements to the
CTC in October 2002,372 regular contacts continued with the office of the
OHCHR. The current Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism,
appointed after the independent expert had presented his report,373 made a
statement to the CTC in October 2008 in which he commented on his visit
to Guantdnamo Bay.374
368 Id. 91.
369 Id.
370 S.C. Res. 1535, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (2004).
371 Note to the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee: A Human Rights Perspective on
Counter-Terrorist Measures, Sep. 23, 2002, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/documents/ohchrl.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Note to the Chair].
372 See id.
373 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Res. 2005/80, 18, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (Apr. 21, 2005) (approving the decision of the Commission to
appoint a Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while counter-
ing terrorism for a period of three years). The Human Rights Council decided to extend the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur for a period of three years on December 14, 2007. See
U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. 6/28, 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/28 (Dec. 14, 2007).
374 See Note to the Chair, supra note 371. See also U.N. Sec. Council, Letter Dated 3 Feb-
ruary 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-terrorism Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2009/71 (Feb. 4, 2009).
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The Special Rapporteur also presented a number of reports to the
Human Rights Council and the General Assembly and has conducted a
number of country visits. 375 The most interesting country visit, which took a
long time to prepare, was to the U.S. In a press conference, the Special
Rapporteur presented some preliminary findings.3 76 The Special Rapporteur
stated in his report:
It was disappointing that the Special Rapporteur was not provided access
to places of detention, including at Guant~namo Bay, with guarantees
permitting private interviews of detainees. It is a part of the Standard
Terms of Reference of all United Nations Special Rapporteurs that any
visits to detention centres involve unmonitored interviews with detained
persons. This is a universally applied term of reference, which in many
parts of the world is essential for the protection of individuals against
abuse. It would give a wrong message to the world if the Special Rappor-
teur were to deviate from this standard condition in respect of the United
States. 77
Similarly, this problem also haunted the four Special Rapporteurs,
including the one on torture, who had made requests since early 2002 to
visit Guantdinamo. The U.S. government finally refused access and the four
Rapporteurs subsequently submitted a report to the last session of the
Commission.378 The report was heavily criticized by the U.S. government as
containing only secondary sources of information. 379 The Special Rappor-
teur expressed the hope to be able to visit Guantinamo in the near future.38 °
He was subsequently allowed to visit Guantdnamo Bay from December 3
through December 7 in 2007 for the purpose of observing hearings under
375 See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General: Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/63/223 (Aug.
6, 2008); U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection ofAll Human Rights Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/10/3/Add. 1 (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/
terrorisrn/rapporteur/reports.html; U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of
All Human Rights Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right
to Development (Addendum), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 0/3/Add.2 (Dec. 16, 2008).
376 Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Oct. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/5677.pdf.
377 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Mar-
tin Scheinin, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3 (Nov. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Report of the
Special Rapporteur].
378 See Situation of Detainees at Guanteinamo Bay, supra note 260.
379 See id. at annex.
380 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 377, 2.
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the 2006 Military Commission Act.3 8' This visit supported concerns re-
flected in his report presented to the sixth session on Human Rights Council
in December 2007 in which he announced rather strong worded conclusions
and recommendations.382
In his conclusions, the Special Rapporteur identified serious incom-
patibilities between international human rights obligations and U.S. counter
terrorism law.383 Such incompatibilities included the "prohibition against
torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the right to life; and the
right to a fair trial., 384 The Special Rapporteur also detected deficiencies in
U.S. law and practice concerning the principle of non-refoulement, the ren-
dition of persons to places of secret detention, and the unlawful surveillance
of persons. 
385
In his fourteen strongly-worded recommendations, the Special Rap-
porteur recommended inter alia that the categorization of persons as
"unlawful enemy combatants" be abandoned.386 He called on the govern-
ment to release or to put on trial those detained under that category.387 The
Special Rapporteur declared:
Notwithstanding the primary responsibility of the United States to resettle
any individuals among those detained in GuantAnamo Bay who are in need
of international protection, the Special Rapporteur recommends that other
States be willing to receive persons currently detained at Guantdnamo Bay.
The United States and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees should work together to establish a joint process by which detainees
can be resettled in accordance with international law, including refugee
law and the principle of non-refoulement. 388
The Special Rapporteur also concluded that the interrogation tech-
niques-which are not explicitly prohibited in the U.S. Army Field Man-
ual-"involve conduct that may amount to a breach of the prohibition
against torture and any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
'' 89
He recommended that "that the [U.S. Army Field Manual] be revised to
381 The Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 5, U.N.
Doc. A/63/223 (Aug. 6, 2008).
382 See id. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 377, 1 53-68.
383 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 377, 53.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 Id. 55.
387 Id.
388 Id. 57.
389 Id. 62.
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expressly state that only enumerated techniques are permissible., 390 Impor-
tantly, he recommended that the CIA practice of extraordinary rendition
should be completely discontinued. 39' He repeated his recommendations in
his latest reports to the General Assembly.392
As the government had promised to the members of the Committee
Against Torture, the Field Manual was revised in September 2006. 393 The
General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution on the issue in which
it deplored the "occurrence of violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the context of the fight against terrorism, as well as violations
of international refugee law and international humanitarian law., 3 94 It urged
states to fully respect non-refoulement obligations under international refu-
gee and human rights law. It also urged states to ensure due process guaran-
tees while fighting terrorism consistent with all relevant provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949. 395
In the annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
presented to the eighth session of the Human Rights Council in June 2008,
it was emphasized that the need to protect and promote all human rights in
counter-terrorism measures forms part of states' duties.39 6 These are two
complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives.397 The report also re-
ferred to a recent judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in the
case Saadi v. Italy where the court:
[R]eaffirmed that the ban on deporting individuals to countries where they
are at risk of torture or ill-treatment is absolute and unconditional. The
judgement also addressed whether a State's duty not to deport where there
is a risk of torture or ill-treatment can be mitigated by promises of humane
treatment from the State to which the individual is to be deported. The
court held that such assurances do not automatically offset an existing risk,
emphasizing "that the existence of domestic laws and accession to treaties
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 See The Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 54-55, 61, U.N. Doc. A/62/263 (Aug. 15,
2007).
393 See U.S. Response, supra note 314.
'94 G.A. Res. 62/159, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/159 (Mar. 11, 2008).
395 Id. 9.
396 U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner and the Secretary General: Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/13, 13 (June 8, 2008) [hereinafter
Annual Report].
391 Id. at pmbl.
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were not sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-
treatment."
' 398
In the concluding paragraphs of the High Commissioner's report,
"the importance of placing human rights at the core of international coop-
eration in counter-terrorism" was underlined, and so was the "obligation of
all states to ensure that measures taken to combat crimes of terrorism com-
ply with their obligations under international human rights law, in particular
the right to recognition as a person before the law, due process, and non-
refoulement. '' 399 Compliance with international human rights standards is
essential, especially when counter-terrorism measures involve the depriva-
tion of individual liberty.400
It should be clear that the international community, represented in
the U.N. and civil society, firmly believes that respect for international law,
international human rights law, and international humanitarian law is the
only way forward. However, in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, discussed in some detail above,40' the Justice Depart-
ment under the Bush administration still showed its disregard for interna-
tional law.
On July 10, 2008, the Justice Department urged the D.C. Circuit
Court to set up a fast schedule leading to a ruling that should reject the
power of federal courts to examine detainees' complains of mistreatment at
Guantdinamo.4 °2 Congress had taken away any such authority, and the Su-
preme Court did not second-guess Congress' actions in its new ruling on
detainee rights.40 3 In a motion filed in Paracha v. Bush,4 4 the Justice De-
partment stated that no detainee had any right to contest his condition of
confinement.40 5 This legal move has apparently now been superseded by the
'9' Id. 33 (citing Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=829510&portal=hbkm
&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2009)).
399 Annual Report, supra note 396, 57.
400 Id.
401 See supra notes 159-74.
402 Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/us-no-
court-review-of-gitmo-conditions/ (July 11, 2008 20:11) (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) [herei-
nafter Lyle Denniston, No Court Review].
403 Id.
404 See Respondent's Motion to Govern Further Proceedings, Paracha et al. v. Bush, No.
05-5194 (D.C. Cir. 2008), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2008/07/paracha-mtn-to-govern-7-10-08.pdf [hereinafter Motion to Govern Further
Proceedings].
405 Lyle Denniston, No Court Review, supra note 402. See also Motion to Govern Further
Proceedings, supra note 404, at 7.
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action undertaken by the new administration as has been demonstrated
above.
In addition, the Justice Department urged the D. C. Circuit Court to
restore government authority to transfer Guantinamo prisoners without
Court permission.4 °6 It argued also that the DTA and the MCA expressly
took away the right to challenge transfers as part of claims against deten-
tion. These latest developments sharply contrast with the opinion of some
federal judges. For example, Justice Hogan declared that
[t]he government has got to get across the message that we are going to
move these cases forward, and not in the normal course of business; this is
an extraordinary situation .... The government has to set aside every oth-
er case pending before them and get these cases moving first .... People
in all levels of government should understand that.4 07
The position by the Justice Department is an aberration of the sepa-
ration of powers guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, it shows
once again the unilateral approach towards international law by the different
governmental departments under the previous administration
40 8
Finally, reference should be made to the important work undertaken
by the International Commission of Jurists regarding counter-terrorism,
human rights, and the rule of law over the last five years. On August 28,
2004, one-hundred and sixty lawyers from all regions of the world met at
the ICJ biennial conference in Berlin and adopted a declaration on uphold-
ing human rights and the rule of law in combating terrorism. 409 This decla-
ration "highlights the grave challenge to the rule of law brought about by
excessive counter-terrorism measures, reaffirms the most fundamental hu-
man rights violated by those measures, and delineates methods of action for
the worldwide ICJ network to address the challenge. 410
406 Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/us-seeks-
new-ruling-on-detention-powers/ (July 9, 2008 17:08) (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). See also
Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantcnamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40
U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 658 (2006).
407 Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/sense-of-
urgency-on-detainees/ (July 8, 2008 18:41) (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
408 For an in-depth analysis, see Peter-Tobias Stoll, Compliance: Multilateral Achievements
and Predominant Powers, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 456, 468-76 (2003). See also Johannes van Aggelen, Note 1, 48
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 666, 666-69 (2005).
409 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ), THE BERLIN DECLARATION: THE ICJ
DECLARATION ON UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN COMBATING
TERRORISM, at pmbl. (Aug. 28, 2004), available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id ar-
ticle=3503?=en.
410 Id. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ), LEGAL COMMENTARY TO THE
ICJ BERLIN DECLARATION; COUNTER-TERRORISM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW-
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW SERIES No. 1 (2008).
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Subsequently, in the adoption of the declaration, the ICJ "called for
the establishment of a high level panel mandated to conduct a detailed study
on the global impact of counter-terrorism measures on human rights.",411 In
2005, the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Hu-
man Rights convened and engaged in a broad-based consultative process to
learn directly about the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures
on human rights and the rule of law around the world. Members of the panel
travelled to take testimony directly from witnesses in sixteen regional, sub-
regional, and national hearings from around the world.41 2 Evidence relating
to more than forty countries was considered.413 Most of the hearings were
public, but several sessions were private.414 Members of the panel met with
politicians, government officials, NGOs, judges and lawyers, journalists,
intelligence and security personnel, and victims on both terrorist violence
and counter-terrorism measures.415
On February 16, 2009, the current president of the ICJ and former
second High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson presented the
report of the panel. The report explored important legal issues raised by the
war paradigm applied by the U.S. in the current struggle against terror-
ism. 4 16 The panel concluded that the U.S. paradigm, by conflicting and con-
fusing acts of terrorism with acts of war, is legally flawed and sets a dan-
gerous precedent.417 The laws of war only apply when there is a situation of
armed conflict according to objective criteria recognized under international
law. Consequently, when terrorist acts are committed outside of such situa-
tions, they are not governed by international humanitarian law, but rather by
domestic criminal law and international human rights law.418 Accordingly,
individuals who are suspected of terrorist offences committed outside of
situations of armed conflict cannot be legally labelled, tried, and/or targeted
as combatants. When Guantdinamo terrorist acts occur during armed con-
flict, such acts may well be considered war crimes, and they are governed
by international humanitarian law together with international human rights
law. Persons suspected of having perpetrated such offences outside armed
conflict cannot legally be placed beyond the protection of the law.4 19
411 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM,
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION, at v
(2009), http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf.
412 Id.
411 Id. at 1.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 9.
416 Id. at 49--64.
417 Id. at 49.
418 Seeid. at 51-52.
419 Seeid. at51.
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The overall findings of the panel were the following:
* Terrorism is a reality and States have a duty to counter the threat
posed, but many current counter-terrorist measures are illegal and even
counterproductive. 420
e The legal framework that existed prior to 9/11 is extremely robust and
effective: international human rights and international humanitarian law
were elaborated precisely to guarantee people's security. The Panel con-
cluded that this legal framework is sufficiently adaptable to meet the cur-
rent threats. 
421
* The Panel found that the framework of international law is being ac-
tively undermined, and many States are reneging on their treaty or cus-
tomary law obligations. The failure of States to comply with their legal du-
ties is creating a dangerous situation wherein terrorism, and the fear of ter-
rorism, are undermining basic principles of international human rights
law. 422
* The Panel was particularly concerned at the evidence worldwide show-
ing that the erosion of international law principles is being led by some of
those liberal democratic States that in the past have loudly proclaimed the
importance of human rights. 
423
* Specifically, the Panel rejects the claim that any "war" on terror ex-
cuses States from abiding by international human rights law and, in armed
conflict situations, international humanitarian law.
424
e Intelligence agencies around the world have acquired new powers and
resources, but legal and political accountability have often not kept425
pace.
e Criminal law is the primary vehicle to be used to address terrorism;
preventive measures and adaptations of the legal framework that are not in
conflict with international human rights principles are acceptable, and may
indeed be required if States are to comply with their duty to protect life
and the security of persons.
426
Those conclusions were also shared by the European Parliament,
which adopted a resolution on the return and resettlement of the
Guantdnamo detention facility inmates. The resolution stated, in particular,
that it invites "the United States to ensure that Guantinamo detainees are
420 Id. at 14.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 id.
425 id.
426 Id. at 15.
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granted their human rights and fundamental freedoms, on the basis of inter-
national and United States constitutional law. 4 27 In addition, "any detainee
against whom the United States has sufficient evidence is properly tried
without delay in a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, im-
partial tribunal and, if convicted, imprisoned in the United States[.]"
428
Moreover, "any detainee who is not to be charged and who chooses volun-
tarily to be repatriated is returned to his home country as quickly and expe-
ditiously as possible., 429 Detainees who are not charged "but cannot be re-
patriated due to a real risk of torture or persecution in their home country"
should be given the opportunity to be admitted to U.S.
43 0
VIII. CONCLUSION
What Professor Koh observed in 2002 is still valid today, namely
We must respond to the September I 1 tragedy in the spirit of the laws:
seeking justice, not vengeance; applying principle, not merely power. We
must respond according to the values embodied in our domestic and inter-
national commitments to human rights and the rule of law. If we are at
war, that war will affect our children's future, and that future-I submit-
is far too important for us, as lawyers, to leave to the politicians and the
generals.
431
The many recommendations contained in the report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary to the new U.S. administration, if implemented,
may result in an enormous step forward regarding respect for international
law. Coming back to the essential question of whether 9/11 has fundamen-
tally shaken the foundations of international law, I am more inclined to be-
lieve, with the conclusions of the ICJ's eminent panel, that it has not. Others
authors, however, are more inclined to believe that it has.432
It is my firm conviction that the international community cannot
continue to act unilaterally. It is indispensable that there will be a permanent
inter-action between the state and the individual. At a conference in New
York in March 2007, I had the privilege to present as a panellist a paper
427 European Parliament Resolution on the Return and Resettlement of the GuantAnamo
Detention Facility Inmates, 3, Eur. ParT. Doc. P6_TA(2009)0045 (Feb. 4, 2009), available
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef--//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-
0045+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN.
428 Id.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 39 (2002).
432 See, e.g., PAUL EDEN & Ti-ERkSE O'DONNELL, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: A TURNING POINT
IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW? (2005); HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND
THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
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entitled A U.N. Human Rights Call for Guantdnamo: Fact or Fiction. At
that time I was totally convinced that it would remain a fiction. With the
new administration I hope it will become a fact.
I would like to conclude referring to a renown correspondence
between Einstein and Freud about the motives of war, in which Einstein
questioned:
How is it that these devices succeed so well in rousing men to such a wild
enthusiasm, even to sacrifice their lives? Only one answer is possible. Be-
cause men has within him lust for hatred and destruction .... Is it possible
to control man's mental evolution so as to make him proof against the psy-
choses of hate and destructiveness? 433
In a prophetic manner he added, "[b]ut I am well aware that the
aggressive instinct operates under other forms and in other circum-
stances., 434 Indeed, the question has been put forward: "Will war one day
disappear from the face of the earth?" The reply was: "Yes, when mankind
understands justice, and practices the law of God; all men will then be
brothers.
4 35
433 ALBERT EINSTEIN & SIGMUND FREUD, WHY WAR?: OPEN LETTERS BETWEEN EINSTEIN
AND FREUD DATED JULY 30, 1932, reprinted in 6 THE NEW COMMONWEALTH 7 (1934).
434 id.
435 ALLAN KARDEC, THE SPIRITS BOOK 307-09 (Anna Blackwell trans., 2001) (responding
to question number seven hundred and forty-three).
